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Vertical Restraints Regulation 
Barbara Ann White* 
Introduction 
In the last twenty years the United States Supreme Court has once 
again effectively redefined acceptable business behavior in the anti-
trust arena.! The Court's changes reflect, in part, the incursion of 
,. Associate Professor oflaw, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. Mathemat-
ics, Hunter College (1969); Ph.D. Economics, Cornell University (l980);J.D. State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo (1985). The author-thanks the following students of the 
University of Houston Law Center for their able research assistance at various stages of 
the development of this Article: Mark Friedman, Class of 1989, Lily Deurmyer and 
James Kovatch, Class of 1991, and particularly, T. Edwin Walker, Class of 1992. The 
author also would like to thank Irene Rosenberg and members of the Vanderbilt Univer-
sity School of Law Seminar Series, in particular Cindy Alexander, James Foster, and 
JasonJohnston for useful comments. This research was supported by the University of 
Houston Law Foundation Summer Grant Program. 
1. The Court's philosophy underlying antitrust decisions certainly has not been 
.constant since the Sherman Act's passage. See Thomas M. Melsheimer, Economics and 
Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1319-20 (1990) (reviewing Eco-
NOMICS & ANTrmUST Poucy (RobertJ. Lamer &James W. Meehan,Jr. eds., 1989». 
Just as different philosophies influence the law in general, so do they influence antitrust 
law in particular. See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and 
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L REV. 936 
(1987); James A. Meehan,Jr. & RobertJ. Lamer, The Structural School, Its Critics, and its 
Progeny: An Assessment, in ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 179 (Robert J. Lamer &James 
M. Meehan,Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter ANTrmUST POUCY]; Timothy J. Waters, Antitrust 
Law and Policy: Rule oj Law or Economic Assumptions, in ANTrmUST Poucy, supra, at 152; 
Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where Has It Been; JVhere It Is Going. in INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION, ANTITRUST, AND PUBLIC Poucy 41-42 (John U. Craven ed., 1983); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 85-158 (discussing the history of vertical restraints 
doctrine). 
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modern efficiency analysis,2 an approach strongly influenced by Chi-
cago School proponents3 claiming objective economic reasoning as 
the basis of their antitrust posture.4 Because the Court's adaptation 
of the economic efficiency standard for evaluating business conduct 
has not occurred in one fell swoop, decisions in antitrust law seem 
to vacillate between an older, populist philosophy,5 which tends to 
take a conspiratorial view of corporate activity,6 and a more modern 
2. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (using economic 
analysis in recognizing the absence of countervailing economic power to forestall the 
anticompetitive threat of defendant's horizontal restraint); National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n (NCAA) v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (using economic analysis 
in determining that horizontal restraints ordinarily subject to automatic condemnation 
were necessary to the survival of the product and therefore potentially procompetitive); 
jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35 (1984) (O'Connor,j., concur-
ring in judgment) (advising the Court to "refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic 
effects, and the potential economic benefits, that a [tying arrangement] may have"); Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (Powell,j., dissenting) 
(applying economic analysis of countervailing power in arguing that anticompetitive 
horizontal price fixing could not occur in the case at bar); see also Donald I. Baker, Anti-
trust Law and Economics at the Political Frontier, in ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 1, at 141 
(noting that "[e]conomists have changed the face of antitrust in the quarter century 
since Brown Shoe"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1696, 1700-01 (1986) (expressing his "skepticism" of antitrust laws in general and argu-
ing that economic analysis is the best way to promote consumer welfare); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 216 (1985) (stating that 
"[a]ntitrust academia, the antitrust bar, and the federal judiciary are filled with people 
who have made serious efforts to learn about price theory and industrial organization"); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. LJ. 271, 279 (1987) (supporting the 
use of economics in antitrust analysis, while expressing concern that too free a use could 
allow potentially objectionable business behavior). 
3. See Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Manag-
ers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1988) (recognizing that Chicago School economic 
theory "has become the dominant tool for contemporary antitrust analysis"); William H. 
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and 
Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989) (evaluating the extensive role and influ-
ence of the Chicago School economic models in Supreme Court decisionmaking over 
the past decade); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925, 939 (1979) ("lTlhe position of the Chicago School on restricted distribution 
has become the orthodox academic position. The decision in Continental T.v., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc. suggests that it is well on its way to becoming the legal position as 
well."); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986) (relying heavily on the work ofleading Chicago School proponents: ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978);john S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 j.L. 
& ECON. 289 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies arid COlmterstrategies, 48 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981». 
4. The views of the Chicago School on antitrust are outlined infra note 6, and have 
been well documented by many of its high profile proponents. See, e.g., ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Easterbrook, supra note 2; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits 
of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Posner, supra note 3. 
5. SeejoE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); Leonard W. Weiss, The 
Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW 
LEARNING (Harvey j. Goldschmid et. al. eds., 1974); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, 
Microeconomics, and Politics: Rejlections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1980). 
6. This Article refers to this antitrust perspective as the Modern Populist School. 
One can view the range of modern antitrust positions among courts and scholars as 
falling along a continuum. At the poles are the extremes of the Modern Populist and the 
Chicago views. Originally, the Populist perspective envisioned competition as atomistic. 
The ideal Populist industry consists of many small firms, each with ready access to the 
marketplace and each operating independently. This ideal presumably would lead to 
lower prices and greater output. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 5; Weiss, supra note 5. The 
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economic view, which examines the competitiveness of market 
forces or the activity's efficiency justification to gauge the legality of 
the scrutinized conduct.7 This inconsistency in the caselaw reflects 
Chicago perspective-the intellectual antecedents of which go as far back as the 
Hamiltonian view of the economy-emphasizes efficiency and economies of scale to 
achieve lower prices, greater output, and consumer welfare. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4; 
Easterbrook, supra note 2; Posner, supra note 3. Although both perspectives are con-
cerned with enhancing society'S well-being, the Populists might be characterized as plac-
ing greater emphasis on the process of competition as they envision that structure, 
whereas the Chicago School can be viewed as more result oriented, in which a competi-
tive environment exists as long as existing firms are spurred to improve their products 
and services by the threat of a potential competitor. 
Toward the Populist end exists the concern for concentrations of economic power, 
while moving in the Chicago direction the primary issue becomes barriers to efficient 
conduct. The Populists seem willing to sacrifice efficiency to preserve the atomistic 
economy, whereas the Chicago School is willing to forgo the presence of many firms if 
they are less efficient than their stronger competitors. The Chicago School also vali~ 
dates efficient corporate strategies even though they may serve as entry barriers to other 
firms. because a new entrant that is even more efficient than the incumbents will not be 
barred by these obstacles. 
In keeping with the Populist's concern, the Supreme Court in the decades from the 
1940s through the 1960s took a more conspiratorial approach in evaluating corporate 
conduct. See infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text. This Modem Populist ap-
proach. which meant that cooperation among competitors was highly suspect and effi-
ciency considerations carried very little weight, led to the creation of many of the per se 
illegal rules. See infra notes 47 & 48. Industrial concentration also was viewed with great 
suspicion. leading to the possibility of corporate disassemblement as an antitrust rem-
edy. See, e.g.. United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 
1982) (resulting in break-up of AT&T), qIf'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 
460 U.S. 1001 (1983). A branch of economic analysis supported this reasoning by argu-
ing that if one could show statistically both industrial concentration and above-average 
profit rates for an industry, it was reasonable to infer that the· firms were engaging in 
monopolization. This view became known as the Structuralist view and served to but-
tress the Modem Populist perspective. See infra notes 9 & 15. Although this analysis was 
developed by economists, the bases of their conclusions were not truly drawn from eco-
nomic reasoning; they had their origins in the Modem Populist perspective. See, e.g., 
Meehan & Lamer, supra note 1. 
More recently, some scholars holding antitrust values not very different from the 
Modem Populist School but who also incorporate modem efficiency analysis into their 
framework have categorized themselves as the "New Coalition." See generally Symposia, 
The Papers Presented at the Arlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative, 76 GEO. LJ. 237; 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 931 (Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky eds., 1987). Much' of their 
writings react to the Chicago School's strong influence on antitrust thinking. See id. 
Clearly, there are scholars all along the continuum between the Modem Populists and 
the Chicago School. The closer these scholars are to the Chicago end of the spectrum, 
the more they tend to emphasize efficiency analysis in their antitrust posture; the closer 
they are to the Modem Populist end of the spectrum, the more they are concerned with 
the form and structure of the market, particularly with regard to agreements and eco-
nomic concentration. 
7. The clearest evidence of the Court's oscillation between an emphasis on the 
Populists' concern for the conspiratorial dimension of business conduct and an effi-
ciency analysis of actual market impact is a series of decisions over the last fifteen years 
regarding horizontal price agreements. Although horizontal price agreements among 
competitors have long been held illegal, see United States v. So cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150,218 (1940), the Supreme Court has vacillated from strict adherence to 
that standard. For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys. (CBS), 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court found that the marketing of virtually every 
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not only the changing composition of the Court,8 but also the extent 
to which efficiency analysis has been accepted by. individual 
copyrighted musical composition in the country through one of two defendant organiza-
tions did not constitute illegal price-fixing. Id. at 4-5,7. Even though the defendants set 
the price for all the compositions in their respective collections by issuing only blanket 
licensing agreements, the Court, relying on efficiency arguments, ruled that there was 
no antitrust violation. !d. at 23-25. Noting that the defendant organizations facilitated 
the creation of an efficient market for compositions by reducing transaction costs for 
potential users, id. at 20-21, as well as insuring that copyright owners received royalties 
for the use of their compositions, id., the Coun concluded that the defendants' conduct 
should be assessed under a rule of reason, id. at 24-25. See infra note 10 for a discussion 
of the rule of reason. The next year, in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 
(1980) (per curiam), the Court returned to a conspiracy focus refusing to consider the 
efficiency justifications behind an agreement among wholesalers to no longer issue 
credit to retailers. Id. at 646. The Court's decision was based on its conclusion that 
credit was a part of price, bringing the agreement under the per se rule prohibiting 
illegal price-fixing. Id. at 648. The fact that the wholesalers still were engaging in price 
competition seemed not to matter to the Court in Catalano. Four years later, shifting 
once more to an economic market analysis in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 
(1984), the Supreme Court decided that a horizontal agreement to restrict supply, an 
activity resoundingly condemned as a form of per se illegal price-fixing since Socony-
Vacuum in 1940, should in the case of the NCAA be judged instead under the rule of 
reason. Id. at 100. Although the Court ultimately found that the economic efficiency 
arguments did not outweigh the restraints on trade imposed by the agreement, id. at 
120, it reached that decision on the basis of economic reasoning, id. at 113-20. Thus, 
though movement toward an economic analytic approach appears to be the long-term 
trend, the Court continues to adopt the Modern Populist view periodically. 
8. The impact of the Court's changing composition is almost humorously apparent 
in its treatment of two cases: Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fort-
ner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969), and United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises., Inc. 
(Fortner 11),429 U.S. 610 (1977). In Foriner 1, Fortner sued a manufacturer ofprefabri-
cated homes and a credit corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary. 394 U.S. at 496-97. 
The credit corporation made favorable loans available for the purpose of purchasing 
and developing land in a local area. The caveat was that these loans were made available 
only to customers who purchased a prefabricated home from the parent corporation to 
build on the land to be developed. Id. at 497. Fortner sued for antitrust violations but 
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. 
United States Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762, 769 (W.D. Ky. 1966), aff'd, 404 F.2d 936 
(6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 495 (1969). Noting that the conduct was in fact a tying 
arrangement, the district court found that the defendant did not have "sufficient market 
power over the tying product [the favorable credit] and [did not] foreclos[e] a substan-
tial volume of commerce in the tied product [the prefabricated homes]" such as to 
render the arrangement illegal. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 497-98. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's ruling, deciding that the dollar 
amount involved in the tied good constituted substantial foreclosure for purposes of a 
per se illegal tying arrangement. Id. at 50 L For the majority, the relevent consideration 
was not that the percentage of the market represented-.00032%-was insignificant, 
but that the number of dollars involved was not "de minimis." Id. at 501-02 & n.L In 
addition, the extremely favorable terms indicated that the credit arrangements might be 
unique and therefore could constitute the economic power necessary to render the tying 
arrangement illegal. Id. at 503-06. The question of uniqueness created a sufficient issue 
of material fact that the district court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, 
and the case was remanded to the district court. It!. at 505-06. The Court noted that, on 
remand, the defendant should have an opportunity to provide some business justifica-
tion for its activities, id. at 506, though the Court rejected the efficiency and procompeti-
tive arguments offered up until that point, id. at 507-10. justice Byron White filed a 
dissenting opinion, in whichjusticejohn M. Harlanjoined. Id. at 510 (White,j., dissent-
ing). justice Abe Fortas also filed a dissenting opinion, with which justice Potter Stewart 
joined. Id. at 520 (Fortas,j., dissenting). 
In retrospect, it is clear that the defendant's primary purpose was to make the prefab-
ricated homes more attractive by effectively lowering their price. Low-cost financing is 
one way to do so. The plaintiff, Fortner, obviously hoped to gain access to the low-cost 
financing for the land without having to buy the home, and brought this suit to achieve 
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Justices.9 
The predominating thrust of the Court's use .of economic analysis 
in the antitrust context has been to assess the pro- and anticompeti-
tive effects of a particular business activity under the rubric of the 
rule of reason.Io Even though there is a wide range of economic 
that end. The Court analyzed the case from a pure Modern Populist perspective, per-
ceiving the competitive loan rates as a unique good with exclusionary impact rather than 
just a form of price competition. 
Not surprisingly, on remand, the district court, following the guidelines set down by 
the Fortner 1 Court, found that the low-cost loan was indeed unique and that an illegal 
tying arrangement did exist. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 613. The defendants appealed to 
the Supreme Court. In the interim, the membership 'ofthe Court had changed substan-
tially. Five Justices had left the bench, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justices Hugo 
Black, William O. Douglas, Harlan, and Fortas. Three of those Justices were in the Fort-
ner I majority-ChiefJustice Warren, and Justices Black and Douglas. Without them, the 
new Court discredited the trial evidence indicating that the loan terms were unique. Id. 
at 621-22. The Court also stated that the district court erred in concluding that the loan 
services constituted significant market power. Id. at 617-18. The Court then engaged in 
a market analysis to show that the loans were simply a form of price competition. Id. at 
620-22. Thus, whether the Court found the arrangement at issue in the Fortner cases to 
be a potentially illegal tying agreement depended on whether the Court adopted a Mod-
ern Populist or an economic efficiency-market perspective. 
9. A good example of the extent to which aJustice will refuse to consider the over-
riding market dynamics can be seen in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 
(1969), a case typically viewed as a prime' example of the St11icturalist perspective of 
antitrust considerations. See supra note 6. Justice Douglas, Writing for the majority, 
presented an excellent modern economic analysis demonstrating that the market in 
which the defendants operated was highly competitive and had been for some time. 
Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 336-37. The market dynamics were so competitive that the 
conduct under scrutiny-a seller phoning some of his competitors to find out their sell-
ing price on a particular good-had virtually no hope of leading to horizontal price-
fixing. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text. In spite of this compelling evi-
dence that he himself articulated, Justice Douglas reacned the opposite conclusion. Jus-
tice Douglas focused on the potential conspiracy element: because the conduct involved 
two sellers communicating price to eacJt other, the conduct was illegal. Container Corp., 
393 U.S. at 337-38. The tone of his opinion was so strong that it easily can be inter-
preted as ruling that communication of price information between sellers is in itself per 
se illegal, an extreme position the Court never before had taken. See id. at 338 (stating 
that "[p]rice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it (0 be used in even an 
informal manner to restrain competition"). Justice Fortas was sufficiendy concerned 
that he wrote a concurring opinion to make clear that he did not hold that view. Id. at 
338-40 (Fortas,J., concurring). One easily can conclude that even in the context of an 
ovenvhelming competitive market climate,Justice Douglas considered that factor irrele-
vant when evaluating the likelihood that communication could convert to a succesful 
horizontal price restraint. 
10. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-
11 (1985) (using economic analysis to determine whether a firm's decision not to coop-
erate with a competing firm was sufficiently procompetitive to overcome its anticompeti-
tive effects); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468'U.S. 85, 104-17 (1984)' (assessing the 
economic impact of horizontal agreement to limit output and fix price in determining 
whether the potential anticompetitive effects were outweighed by the procompetitive 
benefits); BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,5,24 (1979) (finding blanket license system fixing 
prices at the horizontalleve1 not subject to analysis because alternatives were economi-
cally inefficient). Rule of reason analysis, the weighing and balancing of the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects of scrutinized conduct, is one of the two approaches courts take 
to evaluate business activity. The other approach is to deem certain business activity per 
se illegal. See infra noles 46-47 and accompanying text. PHILUP AREEDA & LOUIS 
1991] 5 
antitrust perspectives, 1 1 of which the Chicago School is only one,I2 
there has been little disagreement among supporters concerning the 
Court's use of economics criteria. IS For the most part, the effect has 
been to undo many of the legal barriers to corporate conduct er-
ected by the Modern Populist School14 (often through declarations 
of per se illegality) 15 that economic analysts generally consider 
inefficient. 16 
The question now arises whether some recent applications of eco-
nomic efficiency analysis lay the groundwork for the elimination of 
judicial antitrust supervision altogether; a result, some argue, that is 
the true goal of the Chicago School.17 Although the Chicago School 
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 187-88 (4th ed. 1988); ELEANOR M. Fox &: LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 282-307 (1989); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &: 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 156 (2d ed. 1989). 
II. See, e.g., PHILUP AREEDA &: DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw (1978); F.M. 
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); Richard 
Schmalensee, The New Industrial Organization and the Economic Analysis oj Modem Markets, in 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS THEORY 253 (Werner Hildenbrand ed., 1982). For an antitrust 
analysis drawn from recent theoretical economic developments, see Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker &: Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power 
Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted 
Distribution, and the Marketfor Exclusionary Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1293 (1987) (critiquing 
Krattenmaker &: Salop). For other new economic theoretical developments relevant to 
antitrust but distinct from the Chicago School perspective, see C.C. VON WEIZSACKER, 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT (1980); David M. Kreps &: Robert Wil-
son, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); Paul Milgrom &: 
John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982) 
12. See supra note 3. 
13. For example, scholars have supported the Supreme Court's use of economic 
analysis to avoid condemning a tying arrangement that created efficiencies in Jefferson 
Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See, e.g., Henry N. Butler et al., 
The Futility oj Antitrust Altacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 36 HASTINGS 
LJ. 173, 174 (1984) (presenting a detailed economic analysis showing that firms can 
generate greater profits with legal pricing strategies than would be achieved through tie-
ins, thus rendering a per se illegal rule for tying arrangements unnecessary); Kurt A. 
Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY LJ. 253, 254 (1985) (arguing 
that "[a] coherent antitrust policy must distinguish pro competitive from anticompetitive 
uses of tying"); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future oj American Antitrust 
Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797,805·06 (1987) (asserting that the Court should narrow fur-
ther the scope of prohibited tying arrangements to those that have obvious anticompeti-
tive effects). 
14. See supra note 6. 
15. "The [Warren] Court favored the rule of illegality over the broader rule ofrea-
son analysis." E. THOMAS SULUVAN &:JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST 
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 73 (1988). The Warren Court, with its Structuralist 
approach to antitrust considerations, represented the height of the Modern Populist 
School. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the 
Transformation of/he Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587, 595 (1982) ("[f]hroughout the 1960s ••• 
the structural consensus continued to dominate pUblic, professional, and academic dis-
cussion of antitrust issues. Courts continued to deal with the monopolization offense 
primarily by analyzing market definitions, share determinations, and barriers to entry."); 
see also supra note 6. 
16. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor,j., concurring in judgment) 
(finding no antitrust violation because the procompetitive effects outweighed the an-
ticompetitive effects of the tying arrangement, despite the fact that tying arrangements 
were declared per se illegal during the height of the Modern Populist era). 
17. See, e.g., Fox &: Sullivan, supra note 1, at 957 (arguing that "[d]espite the consen-
sus that economics can playa supporting role, the Chicago School, in the name oflaw 
and economics, has waged ideological warfare, assaulting antitrust itself"); Melsheimer, 
supm note I, at 1335 (stating that "in the hands of Chicago School proponents, econom-
ics has become an engine for an ideology hostile to the operation of antitrust law"); 
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does advocate a limited reach for antitrust law, it still holds that 
business activity should be condemned if it restricts output. IS Nev~ 
ertheless, whenever proponents of that philosophy analyze particu~ 
lar corporate behavior, they invariably conclude that the conduct is 
market driven and is, therefore, necessarily competitive.I9 Chicago 
School analysts often give scholars the impression of instinctively 
condoning business strategies and then developing post~hoc effi~ 
ciency arguments to justify those positions, rather than using eco~ 
nomic reasoning to reach an objective evaluation.20 As a result, an 
increasing number of scholars, whether or not they support the use 
of modem economic thought in the courts, perceive the Chicago 
School position as being adverse to any antitrust regulation at al1.21 
If the Chicago style of economic reasoning leads courts to legal 
conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, eliminate antitrust Fe~ 
strictions on business conduct, then an examination of the economic 
validity of such analyses is imperative. If close economic scrutiny 
does not support the effective abandonment of antitrust evaluation 
of corporate activity, then it behooves those scholars who support 
the use of economics in the courtroom to distance themselves more 
openly from the Chicago perspective.22 
This Article examines one area of antitrust law-vertical re~ 
straints-that not only reflects the changing attitudes of the Court, 
but is also the subject of recent advances in economic theory that 
shed new light on those antitrust conc~ms. Vertical restraints are 
Stephen D. Susman, Business JwJgment vs. Antitrust Justice, 76 GEO. LJ. 337, 345 (1987) 
(asserting that the Supreme Court has been influenced by the Chicago School such that 
it is "abandoning any attempt to achieve the political goals of antitrust regulation"). 
18. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 179 (arguing that only conduct that restricts out-
put so as to raise prices without efficiency gains should be prohibited by the antitrust 
laws); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 39 (suggesting that antitrust law should be like a 
system of filters that remove from scrutiny efficient conduct and "pass only practices 
that are likely to reduce output and increase price"). 
19. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 969. 
20. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1715-
16 (1986) ("Chicago's critical contention and presumption that firms act efficiently is not 
a descriptive observation that produces the conclusion that almost everything is legal. It 
is simply argument supporting the normative claim that people (including firms) should 
be left free to act and that there is almost never a higher social interest."); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 2, at 234 (contending that "the Chicago School's claim ofa unified, internally 
consistent, and nonpolitical antitrust policy rests on premises whose soundness and ap-
plication to the real world are not self-evident"). 
21. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 226-31; Page, supra note 3, at 1223. 
22. Some economics-oriented scholars already have. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra 
note 2, at n. * ("The author admits a great admiration for Chicago School antitrust pol-
icy, and confesses that he has been a fellow traveler for some time. Nevertheless, he 
believes that the Chicago School generally did a much better job of defending its posi-
tion when it was a tiny squad of embattled outsiders instead of a triumphant division."); 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 11 (using economic analysis drawn from theoretical 
models to show circumstances when exclusionary conduct can lead to a lowering of con-
sumer welfare). For those economics-oriented scholars who were always in some disa-
greement with the Chicago school, see supra note] 1. 
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restrictions imposed by manufacturers in governing the conduct of 
the distributors of their products.23 The Supreme Court's rulings in 
this area over the last two decades increasingly have incorporated 
modern economic efficiency factors as part of the expanding use of 
the rule of reason,24 a move much applauded by economics-ori-
ented antitrust scholars.25 The two most recent cases, however, 
Business Electronics Gorp. v. Sharp Electronics Gorp.,26 decided in 1988, 
and Atlantic Richfield Go. (ARGO) v. USA Petroleum GO.,27 decided in 
1990, while giving the appearance of continuing that trend, seem, 
upon closer examination, to be shifting more in the direction of in-
voking economic reasoning to effectively dismantle antitrust regula-
tion of vertical restraints altogether, a position openly supported by 
the Chicago School. 28 Through its antitrust decisions of the last two 
years, the Court has made any potential finding of illegality for verti-
cal price restraints remote, ifnot nonexistent.29 In other words. the 
ultimate effect of the Sharp and ARGO decisions. which address the 
price-fixing component of vertical restraints, may not be only to in-
crease the proportion of vertical restraints that are now judged 
under the balancing approach of the rule of reason. an interpreta-
tion held by many experts.30 but also to render some, ifnot all. ver-
tical price-fixing de facto per se legal.sl 
23. For purposes of this Article, the tenn "distributors" refers to all business enti-
ties that act as commercial intennediaries between manufacturers and the ultimate con-
sumer. Thus, distributors includes wholesalers, distributors, dealers, and retailers. 
Frequently, these tenns are used interchangeably, as exemplified by the cases on vertical 
restraints. 
24. See irifra text accompanying notes 130-212. 
25. For example, a number of scholars approved of the Court's decision, in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), to move, for efficiency rea-
sons, vertical nonprice restraints to the rule of reason category. See, e.g., Milton 
Handler, Refonning the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1301 (1982) (stating that 
"[t]he errors of Schwinn have been remedied by Sylvania, in which the Court announced 
that a rule of reason would thenceforth govern the legality of all non-price vertical re-
strictions"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U. L. REV. 
521,522 (1984) (arguing that the courts should condemn a manufacturer's restrictive 
behavior only "when the restrictions are used to facilitate inefficient price discrimina-
tion"); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Rejlections on the 
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) (praising the economic analysis used by 
the Supreme Court to detennine when conduct is anticompetitive). 
26. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
27. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). 
28. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 AN-
TITRUST LJ. 135, 135 (1984) (asserting that all vertical restrictions, including price, are 
the same and as a class should not "be a subject of serious antitrust attention"); Thomas 
A. Piraino, Jr., The CaseJor Presuming the Legality ofQpality Motivated Restrictions on Distribu-
tion, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,34 (1988) (stating that per se legality would free manu-
facturers to improve the quality of their product and enhance consumer welfare); 
Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment oj Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legalit)~ 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6,8 (1981) (arguing that declaring "purely vertical restric-
tions on distribution" legal would create ajudiciaUy manageable standard compared to 
the rule of reason or the illegal rule). 
29. See irifra notes 189-242 and accompanying text. 
30. See inJra note 75. 
31. No fonnal pronouncement of per se legality has yet been handed down by the 
Court. This Article demonstrates however, that Justice Antonin Scalia's structural defi-
nition of per se illegality for vertical price restraints in Sharp, without more, in fact cre-
ates a category of per se legality. See infra notes 213-25 and accompanying text. 
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In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical re-
straints, one in law32 and one in economics.ss By tracing the check-
ered legal history of vertical restraints,34 I show the marked changes 
recent antitrust decisions have wrought, in particular, by comparing 
the legal standards expressed by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Gorp. S5 with those in Sharp and ARGO. S6 If 
through the latter two cases the Court has, for all practical purposes, 
created a category of per se legality for vertical price restraints, 
which I believe to be the case, then it would not be unreasonable to 
expect the Court to proceed in the same fashion ivith respect to ver-
tical nonprice restraints in the future.'s7 
Mter assessing the current legal status of vertical restraints 
through market analyses, I then demonstrate that the economic rea-
soning justifying their per se legal treatment is no~ as compelling as 
previously believed. I show this in two respects. One evaluation 
stems from recent advances in economic theory exploring the dy-
namics underlying the manufacturer's decision process when select-
ing a method of product distribution. By drawing on those 
developments, I identify market scenarios not 'previously consid-
ered, in which the anticompetiti~e effects of vertical Px1ce restraints 
on certain distribution strategies raise new and legitimate antitrust 
concerns.S8 A second inquiry reexamines the economic issue that 
initially gave rise to arguments in favor of the legalization of vertical 
price restraints, that is, the ph-enomepon of price-~scounting retail-
ers who are also free riders.s9 Some commentators have argued 
that manufacturers should be able to impose vertical price restraints 
to protect against the dealer erosion that free-riding precipitates.4o 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 159-242. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 243-331. 
34. See irifra text accompanying notes 77-242. 
35. 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see irifra text accompanying notes 159-88. 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 193-242. . . 
37. A survey of thirty court of appeals decisions since Sylvania in cases of dealer 
termination shows an already existing propensity to rule for the defendant when the rule 
of reason is used. Of the thirty opinions, twenty-four or 80% favored the defendant on 
the antitrust claims. Many of the opinions were affirmations of summary judgments or 
directed verdicts in favor of the defendant. The circuits with the most antitrust activity 
were the Fifth (six decisions for the defendant and none for the plaintiff) and the Ninth 
(seven decisions for the defendant and none for the plaintiff). See Appendix for meth-
odology and list of cases. 
38. These scenarios are ofa very different dimension, see infra notes 282-310 and 
accompanying text, from the economic concerns regarding cartelization that already 
have been raised about vertical price restraints, see irifra text accompanying notes 258.81. 
39. See irifra text accompanying notes Ip9·65. 
40. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 15; at 118; Kenneth Kelly, The Role of 
the Free Rider ill Resale Price Mailltenance: The Loch Ness Monster of Anti/rust Captured, 10 GEO. 
MASON U. L. REV. 327, 338-39 (1988); Lester G. Telser. Wh}' Should Mamifacturers n'tlllt 
Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. Be ECON. 86, 91 (1960). But see Willard F. Mueller. The Sealy Restraints: 
Restrictions on Free Riding or Output?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1255; see also ilifra text accompany-
ing notes 311-31. 
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Reaching a different conclusion, this Article demonstrates that 
either the manufacturer can achieve those same ends through less 
trade-restrictive business methods that may, in addition, enhance 
consumers' satisfaction, or, that the strategies themselves, from an 
economics perspective, are not worthy of protection.41 
Together, both economic analyses, that of the manufacturer's dis-
tribution choices and that of the free rider phenomenon. signify that 
unfettered freedom for manufacturers to impose whatever vertical 
arrangements they choose actually can foster lower efficiency levels 
and consumer welfare, the primary economic measures used to eval-
uate antitrust policy. These results are at variance with those of the 
Chicago School and indicate the need for more subtle, yet well-de-
fined, antitrust treatment of vertical restraints than per se legal rules 
offer. The conclusions of this Article's market evaluations demon-
strate further that the rigidity created by per se illegal treatment of 
vertical price restraints also lowers consumer welfare when applied 
to certain commonly occuring manufacturer-retailer relationships. 
Given that neither per se illegal nor per se legal rules for vertical 
price restraints have the flexibility to make the crucial distinctions 
between a manufacturer's pro- and anticompetitive conduct, this Ar-
ticle argues for the application of a rule of reason standard that in-
corporates those features of market structure that economic 
reasoning indicates will ensure pro competitive impact. 
Part I of this Article gives an overview of recent developments and 
debates in vertical restraints antitrust law. Part II shows that the 
development of vertical restraints antitrust law reflects the fact that, 
historically, the Supreme Court's philosophy for determining anti-
trust violations has gone through several transformations. Part III 
shows how the Court's decision to give separate antitrust treatment 
for non price restraints represents one of those transformations. 
The opinions in that period demonstrate the struggle between the 
then-predominant Modern Populist philosophy and the emerging 
efficiency-market approach. Part IV delineates the conundrum cre-
ated by the Court in Monsanto through its efforts to accommodate 
the Populists' concern for preventing price-fixing conspiracies while 
emphasizing the economic arguments regarding free-riding. Part V 
presents and analyzes the Sharp opinion, showing how that decision 
may in fact create categories of per se legality for vertical price fix-
ing. Part V also shows how ARGO, when read in conjunction with 
the Court's pronouncements in Matsushita Electric Industrial Go. v. 
Zenith Radio Gorp.,42 furthers the movement towards per se legality. 
Part VI then addresses the viability of the economic arguments sup-
porting per se legality for vertical price restraints in three sections. 
The first section reviews the traditional concerns that vertical price-
fixing can facilitate horizontal price-fixing agreements, also known 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 311-31. 
42. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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as cartelization. The second section" "describes' more complex cir-
cumstances in which, if vertical price restraints were permitted, in-
dustry monopoly pricing could occur without the presence of any 
cartel agreements, express or implied. By applying this analysis to a 
more generalized market framework. this section shows how vertical 
price-fixing not only facilitates such monopoly pricing but also fore-
stalls intrabrand price competition, a particularly important market 
dynamic in this case, one that otherwise would counterbalance the 
industry'S monopoly pricing tendencies. Ironically, previous eco-
nomic analysis of vertical restraints law has treated intrabrand price 
competition as a relatively unimportant phenomenon.43 It has been 
primarily the Modem Populist School that has fought for its protec-
tion in general.44 The second section demonstrates, however, that 
per se illegal treatment of vertical price restraints also can prevent 
pro competitive impacts; in certain instances, it actually can prevent 
a lowering of prices that otherwise might occur. The third section 
evaluates the argument that manufacturers should be allowed to use 
vertical price restraints as a means of enforcing permissible non-
price restraints and prevent free riders. This section shows that 
consumer welfare actually would be better served if manufacturers 
used other methods and, in the circumstances when that was not 
possible, society would be better off without those restraints. Part 
VII concludes this Article with some remarks on ~e problems cre-
ated by the extreme positions of both the Modem Populists and the 
Chicago School proponents, and advocates the benefits of taking 
the middle road. 
43. See Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Mailing Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155, 171 (1984-85) (noting that "the Court's opinion in Sylvania 
clearly indicates that a mere showing of an intrabrand impact is not enough to find a 
pernicious effect on competition): Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE 
Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1. 5 (1982) (stating that intrabrand restraints should be al-
lowed because they do not act to restrict output): E. Thomas Sullivan, On Nonprice Compe-
tition: An Economic and Marketing Analysis, 45 U. PlIT. L. REV. 771. 785 (1984) 
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has rejected the assumption that lower prices in-
crease the quality of goods and services in the area of intrabrand competition). For 
cases examining the role of intra brand competition versus interbrand competition, see 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 O.S. 717, 726-27 (1988); 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977). 
44. SeeJohnJ. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" oj Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1095, 1131 (1986) (stating that U[t]he 
exercise of vertical restraints often increases prices to consumers by curbing or abolish-
ing intrabrand competition"); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Ana~ysis oJNon-
Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. I, 33 (1978) (arguing that "rule of reason 
treatment in an area like non-price vertical restraints, involving an effort to qualify the 
trade offbetween lost intra-brand competition and enhanced inter-brand competition, is 
largely an effort to measure the unmeasurable"). For opinions critical of the intrabrand-
interbrand trade-off, see Sharp, 485 U.S. at 748-49 (Stevens. J.t dissenting); United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (Clark.J., dissenting). 
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1. Vertical Restraints Law: Developments and Debates 
Recent antitrust history divides manufacturer regulation of dealer 
activities into two categories: those involving restraints on the deal-
ers' sales price, and those involving restraints on activities other 
than dealer pricing, such as dealers' access to certain territories or 
particular customers.45 Historically, vertical price restraints have 
been treated as per se iIlega1.46 The per se rule applies to corporate 
behavior that a court deems so inherently undermining of competi-
tive market forces in general that it will not consider any efficiency 
or competition justifications of a particular case.47 The strongest 
advocate for using per se illegal categories is the Modern Populist 
SchooI.48 The Modern Populists argue that per se rules conserve 
judicial resources and provide certainty for the business 
community.49 
45. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). 
46. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical 
Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); see infra text accompanying notes 
85·92. 
47. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (holding 
that agreement among doctors' to set maximum fees for insured patients was per se 
illegal notwithstanding proffered pro competitive justifications); Catalano, Inc. v. Target 
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that an agreement between 
competitors to eliminate credit was "one form of price-fixing [that has] been adjudged 
to lack any 'redeeming virtue: [thus being] conclusively presumed illegal without fur-
ther examination under the rule of reason"); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 608, 610-11 (1972) (ignoring claims of beneficial economic effects in holding 
horizontal territorial restraint by an association of retailers to be a per se illegal re-
straint); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) 
(holding that an agreement to set maximum prices was per se illegal); United States v. 
So cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (stating that "price-fixing agree-
ments are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called com-
petitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate 
may be interposed as a defense"). 
48. Of the five categories of restraints the Court has declared per se violations of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), four occured during the Modern Populist era. 
See Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (horizontal market division); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 12 (1947) (tying arrangements); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (horizontal 
price-fixing). The fifth per se illegal category is vertical price-fixing, established·in 1911 
in Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373. On occasion, some members of the Court tended toward per 
se rules so strongly that concurring Justices felt compelled to clarify that the Court aid 
not intend to go that far. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 
333, 338-40 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (objecting to the implications of Justice 
Douglas' majority opinion that the mere one-on-one exchange of price information was 
in itself per se illegal). For a more extensive discussion of Justice Douglas' opinion, see 
supra note 6. For a discussion of the Warren Court perspective, see supra note 14. 
49. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se 
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. LJ. 1487, 1489 (1983) ("Per se rules represent a 
recognition that (1) antitrust trials, absent a per se approach, are long, expensive, and 
complex, (2) efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws is a justifiable policy goal, and 
(3) there is a virtue in telling businessmen accurately and precisely the location oflegal 
limits on business conduct."); see also Topco. 405 U.S. at 607 (" 'Th[e] principle of per se 
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the 
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the 
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation ... .''' 
(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (l958»). For a discussion of 
Topco as a Modern Populist case, see Barbara A. White, Countervailing Power in Anti-
trust Law and Economics: New Directions for Restraint of Trade Analysis, 1992 DUKE 
LJ. (forthcoming Feb. 1992). 
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Nonprice vertical restraints, on the other lian<;l; are evaluated 
under the rule of reason,50 Rule of reason analysis, the antitrust 
alternative to per se illegal categorization, weighs the pro- and an-
ticompetitive effects of corporate conduct in the specific context in 
which it arises.51 The rule of reason can permit business restraints 
with strong pro competitive effects to be upheld, whereas if the same 
conduct were categorized as per se illegal, it automatically would be 
condemned. In recent times, rule of reason analysis has provided 
the flexibility to incorporate many of ,the developments in modern 
economic theory that assist courts in refining their assessments of 
competitiveness in the marketplace. 52 
The Court's first intimation that it might make a distinction be-
tween the antitrust treatment of vertical price and nonprice re-
straints was not realized immediately.53 In the conflict between the 
Modern Populist philosophy and the economic efficiency approach, 
the former temporarily prevailed, keeping nonprice restraints in the 
50. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). 
51. In SIandard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court developed the 
standards for evaluating business activities as reasonable or unreasonable restraints of 
trade based on balancing the restraint's pro- and anticompetitive effects. The opinion 
labeled this approach the rule of reason. Id. at 66. It is often considered the predomi-
nating mode of antitrust assessment in the courts. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (noting that "there is a preSumption in favorofa 
rule-of-reason standard [and] that departure from that standard must be justified by 
demonstrable economic effect"); RudolphJ. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Aniitrust Law: 
Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 285, 285 (1989) ("[T]he 
Supreme Court's adoption of the 'rule of reason' in 1911 represents the emergence of 
modem antitrust law."). 
52. Of course, one of the conflicts between the Modem Populist School and the 
advocates of the use of economic analysis is the definition of what constitutes working 
competition. Generally, the Modem Populist School focuses on business conduct that 
restricts others' entrance into an industry or that concentrates economic power. See, e.g., 
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 
1140,1154 (1981) (defining the goals of antitrust as "the commitment to power disper-
sion, economic opportunity, and competition as market"); Robert Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, ·127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing that an antitrust policy 
focusing exclusively on economic concerns would lead to "an economy .•• dominated 
by a few corporate giants"); Sullivan, supra note 5, at 4 (praising the Warren Court for 
having a concept of competition that included "easing market access, protecting dealer 
independence, promoting good faith in transactions, and correcting extreme disparities 
in bargaining power"). Advocates of economic analysis primarily are concerned with 
conduct that is efficient (that is, allowing more output at a lower cost) and that could not 
prevent other producers from competing through lower prices. See. e.g., AREEDA & TUR-
NER, supra note II, § 103, at 7 (arguing that "[t]he economic objective of a pro-competi-
tive policy is to maximize consumer economic welfare through efficiency in the use and 
allocation of scarce resources"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive justice and the Antitrust 
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,28 (1982) (acknowledging tha~ antitrust, as an econom-
ics-oriented area of the law, can be more concerned witli efficiency than other societal 
values); Sullivan, supra note 43, at 798 (arguing that courts should focus on an agree-
ment's effect on output and should not limit its analysis to the price factor). 
53. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Supreme Court 
first suggested such a possibility, although it did not so rule. Id. at 261-64. 
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per se illegal category for several years.54 Eventually, however, in 
response to severe criticism from scholars arguing that many verti~ 
cal nonprice restrictions served important efficiency purposes and 
therefore were not deserving of automatic condemnation,55 the 
Supreme Court decided, in Continental T. v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc. 55 to apply rule of reason analysis to those cases instead.57 The 
implications of Sylvania were not only that the Court would consider 
the overall pro~ and anticompetitive effects to determine whether 
such restraints violated the Sherman Act,58 but also that it would do 
so through an efficiencyanalysis.59 Restraints involving price, how~ 
ever, remained per se illegal.60 
Since Sylvania, increasing concern over the phenomenon of free 
riders has stimulated debate as to whether vertical price restraints 
also can have a predominately pro competitive effect.61 Free riders 
are retailers who discount their prices and reap the benefit of other 
retailers' efforts to stimulate consumer demand for a manufacturer's 
product without contributing to the costS.62 Such activities make 
other retailers reluctant to undertake the additional efforts, thereby 
giving manufacturers an incentive to impede the free rider. 53 Im~ 
posing vertical price restraints is one means to prevent free riding. 
An expanding number of economists and antitrust scholars assert 
that the elimination of free riders can benefit the consumer as well 
as the manufacturer, and therefore ultimately may be procompeti~ 
tive.54 According to this view, the services that manufacturers want 
dealers to provide enhance the quality of the product to the con~ 
sumer. Because resale price maintenance (that is, setting a mini~ 
mum price below which dealers cannot charge at the retail level) is 
54. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967). 
55. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor 
and its Ajtemzath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968); Earl E. Pollock, Alternative Distribution 
Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 595 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy 
and the Supreme Court: An Analysis oj the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential 
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975). 
56. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
57. [d. at 57-59. 
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). 
59. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59 (noting the "substantial scholarly and judicial 
authority supporting the[] economic utility" of nonprice vertical restrictions, while not-
ing also that "[t]here is relatively little authority to the contrary"). 
60. Id. at 51 n.18. 
61. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988) (stat-
ing that manufacturers have a legitimate interest in promoting the quality of their prod-
uct through services provided by their dealers); James W. Meehan, Jr. & Robert S. 
Lamer, A Proposed Rule oj Reasonfor Vertical Restraints on Competition, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 
195,206 (1981) (stating that to "induc[e] the desired behavior from independent deal-
ers, manufacturers may adopt vertical restrictions in order to obtain from dealers the 
investment in training and facilities, the performance of services, and the maintenance 
of product quality that will yield maximum profits to manufacturers"); Piraino, supra 
note 28, at 6. 
62. See Telser, supra note 40, at 91. 
63. See id. at 91-92. 
64. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 148; Kelly, supra note 40, at 329; Telser, supra note 
40, at 89-90. 
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one effective means to assure that services will be provided,65 and 
because resale price maintenance can be a form of vertical price-
fixing, some scholars have argued that vertical price-fixing should 
be subject to the rule of reason standard so as to permit those re-
strictions that promote efficiency.66 On the other hand, the Modern 
Populist School holds that the potential anticompetitive effects of 
vertical price-fixing are so severe--because of the restriction on 
competition among the dealers-that it should remain in the per se 
illegal category. 67 Then there are the Chicago School commenta-
tors, who argue that not only should vertical price-fixing be taken 
out of the per se illegal category, but that it, along with all other 
vertical restraints, should be deemed per se legal, and thus not 
come under antitrust scrutiny at al1.68 
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,69 and ARCO v. 
USA Petroleum,70 despite pressure to the contrary,71 the Supreme 
Court maintained its formal position that vertical price-fixing is sub-
ject to per se condemnation.72 These holdings nevertheless, at the 
very least, narrowed the reach of antitrust laws with respect to verti-
cal price restraints. The Court in Sharp held that for conduct to be 
considered vertical price-fixing, it had to contain an agreement as to 
specific price or price levels.75 In ARGO, the Court ruled that a 
plaintiff could not claim antitrust injury from the illegal vertical 
price-fixing activities of a competitor unless the plaintiff also could 
show that the activities constituted predatory pricing.74 The Court's 
analyses in these two cases have led many scholars to conclude that 
a substantial portion of vertical price-fixing now effectively falls 
65. To understand how resale price maintenance can ensure that retailers provide 
the services the manufacturer desires, see irifra text accompanying notes 311-31. 
66. See, e.g., Tyler A. Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Sec-
tion One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1465·66 (1981); Betty 
Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 1985 ANTITRUST BULL. 117, 136-37, 140-
41; F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST LJ. 687, 706 (1983); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transactions Cosl Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 992-93 (1979). 
67. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 50, at 1488 (arguing that resale price agreements 
"completely eliminate price flexibility at the dealer level and may stabilize higher prices 
at the manufacturer level"). For an argument in support of the per se rule on economic 
grounds, see Comanor, supra note 55, at 1001 (advocating the ph se illegal rule in the 
interest of 'judicial economy" even if some pro competitive behavior becomes 
prohibited). 
68. See BORK, supra note 4, at 288; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 135; Piraino, supra 
note 28, at 6; Posner, supra note 28, at 8. 
69. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
70. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). . . . . 
71. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) 
(noting that several amicus briefs recommending abandoning per se illegality for resale 
price maintenance had been filed). 
72. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1889 n.5; Sharp, 485 U.S. at 736. 
73. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 735-36. 
74. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1892. 
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under rule of reason scrutiny.75 A closer analysis of the cases in 
their historical context indicates that the Court may in fact have 
gone further, creating categories of per se legality for vertical price 
restraints.76 
II. Vertical Price Restraints Traditions 
One can view the history of vertical price restraints as reflecting 
the Court's changing perception as to what constitutes an under-
mining of the competitive process, an objective it understood the 
Sherman Act77 was designed to prevent.7S The caselaw indicates 
that initially, the Court made distinctions between permissible and 
impermissible vertical restraints on the basis oflaissez-faire freedom 
of contract principles.79 In the next era the Court evaluated vertical 
restraints by looking at the totality of the circumstances to deter-
mine the extent to which trade had been restrained.so It then 
turned toward a Modern Populist view that emphasized whether an 
agreement existed without much regard for the actual impact on 
75. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Long, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Re-
sale Price Fixing Moves Toward The Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1991);jean W. 
Burns, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Vertical Antitrust Restraints, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 
26-28 & n.190 (1990); Dennis O. Dougherty, Note, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 985 (1989); 
Thomas A. Piraino,jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in Distributor Termi-
nation Cases, 38 EMORY LJ. 311, 315 (1989). Although the preceding authors are critical 
of what they see as the Coqrt's failure to achieve its purported goals, they do not agree 
as to what the Court's purported goals were. For reactions of various members of the 
Antitrust Bar, see Ky. P. Ewing,jr., Antitrust in the lOOth Congress: Issues, Rhetoric, Reality, 2 
ANTITRUST 33, 36 (1987); Charles F. Rule & David L. Meyer, Doom For Discounters? Let 
Consumers Choose Where to Shop, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1988, § 3, at 2. 
76. See infra text accompanying notes 189-242. 
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). 
78. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. ofTradev. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (stating 
that "(t]he true test of legality is whether restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition"); United States v. joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 
(1898) (stating that "[t]he natural, direct and immediate effect of competition is, how-
ever, to lower rates, and to thereby increase the demand for commodities, the supplying 
of which increases commerce, and an agreement, whose first and direct effect is to pre-
vent this play of competition, restrains instead of promoting trade and commerce"). In 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945), often cited 
by the Supreme Court, judge Learned Hand speculated on Congress' insight behind the 
Sherman Act: "It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a 
system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and charac-
ter, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the directions of a 
few." See also Coppenveld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) 
("It is not enough that a single firm appears to restrain trade unreasonably, for even a 
vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may cap-
ture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may 
suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competi-
tion that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster."); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competi-
tors, which the [ShermanJ Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire 
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned 
businesses. "). 
79. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
john D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
80. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. 
Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921). 
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trade.sl With the emergence of a more analytical economic ap-
proach, the Court struggled to evaluate vertical restraints on the ba-
sis of their economic efficiency.82 Presently, the Court seems to be 
entering a new era in which it looks toward possible elimination of 
antitrust regulation of vertical arrangements,S3 a perspective that 
comports with many of the values of the Chicago School. 84 
The Supreme Court's analysis in its first two cases on vertical re-
straints, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons CO.85 (decided in 
1911) and United States v. Colgate & CO.86 (decided in 1919) was in 
keeping with its laissez-faire approach to commercial conduct.87 
The effect, however, was to put forth two opinions that, with respect 
to antitrust vertical restraint law, were in see~ing conflict. As a re-
sult of this discord, Dr. Miles and Colgate have provided the under-
pinnings for the Court's vacillations between two extremes as its 
judicial philosophy has changed over the course of the last seventy 
years. 
In Dr. Miles the Court ruled, on the basis of property doctrines 
prohibiting restraints on alienation, that manufacturers could not 
contract with distributors to set the resale price of the manufac-
tur~r's goods to customers.S8 Tpe Cou~t held that once the goods' 
title passed from manufacturer. to distributor, the man~acturer 
could not exercise control over any contract between the distributor 
and its customers. S9 An exception to the property rule:: only could 
81. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & 
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 
(1944). 
82. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
83. See ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Business Elecs. Corp. 
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
84. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
85. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
86. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
87. See James May, Antitrust in the Fonnative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Consti-
tutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257 (1989), for an excellent 
historical examination of the influence of laissez-faire economic theory on the develop-
ment of antitrust jurisprudence. Professor May argues that "once in America there was 
a powerful, widely shared vision of a natural, rights-based political and economic order 
that simultaneously tended to ensure opportunity, efficiency, prosperity, justice, har-
mony, and freedom; and laissez-faire constitutionalism and antitrust law were deemed to 
be crucial, complementary vehicles for its realization." Id. at 391. 
88. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404. Black's Law Dictionary defines restraint on alienation 
as follows: "A provision in an instrument of conveyance which prohibits the grantee 
from seIling or transferring the property which is the subject of the conveyance. Many 
such restraints are unenforceable as against public policy •••• " BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 1181 (5th ed. 1979). Contracts used by Dr. Miles placed a restraint on alienation by 
prohibiting the object conveyed from being sold below a specified price. . . 
89. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 399-400. The case actually involved two types of con-
tracts, one for wholesalers and one for retailers. The Court found no problem with Dr. 
Miles' contract setting resale prices for wholesalers, because those contracts retained the 
wholesalers as agents for Dr. Miles. Id. at 398. The implication was that no antitrust 
violation existed when selling prices of agents were dictated by the manufacturer. This 
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be created if it was in the public interest.9o Because resale price 
agreements obviously restrained trade,91 antitrust law would not 
permit such an exception. The Dr. Miles decision came to be recog-
nized as establishing a per se rule against resale price agreements 
between manufacturer and distributor.92 
Eight years later, in apparent contrast to its earlier decision, the 
Court in Colgate ruled that a manufacturer has the right to terminate 
a dealer for any reason, including the dealer's refusal to charge its 
customers the price that the manufacturer wants it to charge.93 
Although Dr. Miles and Colgate appear to be in tension, they can be 
seen as being consistent with the Court's overarching concern for 
fostering laissez-faire values.94 Dr. Miles, in preventing restraints on 
alienation, assured retailers the freedom to contract with customers 
as they saw fit, and Colgate, by permitting manufacturer termination 
of dealers for any reason, including disagreements over retail price, 
protected the manufacturers' right to do business with whomever 
they wished. 
Even though Dr. Miles and Colgate were not inconsistent with each 
other with respect to laissez-faire doctrines, the two cases created 
considerable confusion in the lower courts with regard to antitrust 
issues.95 In United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,96 the Court made it 
quite clear, however. that it saw no inherent contradiction: 
It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference be-
tween the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indi-
cates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings 
with all who fail to observe them, and one where he enters agree-
ments ... with all customers throughout the different states which 
undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices . . .. [T]he 
parties are combined through agreements designed to take away 
dealers' control of their own affairs and thereby destroy competi-
tion and restrain the free and natural flow of trade amongst the 
states.97 
Although the Court did not articulate specific guidelines for de-
termining what particular activities or contexts would fall within 
either Colgate or Dr. Miles, the language the Court used indicated 
that it was concerned largely with the degree of pervasiveness of the 
interpretation was confinned in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485-
87 (1926). But in 1964, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), the Court 
decided that even consignments should come under antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 16. 
90. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406. 
91. Id. at 400. 
92. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (stating that under 
Dr. Miles, .. 'there is an unlawful combination where a manufacturer enters into agree-
ments ... which undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices'" {quoting 
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920))). 
93. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
95. See, e.g., United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175 (1919) (interpreting 
Colgate as overruling Dr. Miles), rev'd, 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 
96. 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 
97. Id. at 99-100. 
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agreements' restrictions. In other words. the focus was on the ex-
tent to which trade was restrained. The Court's first opportunity to 
evaluate specific conduct occurred the next year in Frey & Son, Inc. v. 
Cudahy Packing CO.98 In Frey the Court held that a defendant's re-
peated communication of its price list to distributors as a price floor, 
and the distributors' subsequent "cooperation" did not fall within 
Dr. Miles' parameters and therefore were not, without more, a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.99 In tJ:tis period of vertical restraints anti-
trust law (in contrast with the later Modern Populist era) ,100 
communication and acquiescence alone did not constitute an illegal 
agreement. IOI Rather, the Court examined the totality of the cir-
cumstances and the overall competition to determine the existence 
of a violation.l°2 
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., lOll a 1922 case, is further evidence of 
the Court's primary concern at that time for the ultimate market im-
pact. In Beech-Nut, the Court decided that the encompassing effect 
of certain activities on the manufacturer's part rendered them be-
yond permissible behavior under Colgate and thus were sufficient to 
constitute a combination to suppress price competition. 1M Beech-
Nut, a nationwide company, instituted an elab.orate syst~m to detect 
and cut off price-cutters. 105 The Court founa that even though "the 
merchandising conduct of the company d[id] not constitute a con-
tract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained, or en-
forced,"lo6 the company's conduct did "show suppression of the 
freedom of competition by methods ... which ... secureD the coop-
eration of its distributors and customers. which are quite as effectual 
as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish the same 
purpose."107 The Court noted that through these cooperative activ-
ities Beech-Nut w.as able to "preventD all who do not sell at resale 
98. 256 U.S. 208 (1921). 
99. ld. at 210-11. 
100. See infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text. 
101. Although the Court, during the Modem Populist era, ultimately concluded that 
communication and acquiescence alone could constitute an agreement, see infra text ac-
companying note 125, the Court, in Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U.S. 752 (1984), reversed that conclusion, id. at 762-64, thereby in effect resurrecting 
the Frey standard, see infra text accompanying notes 166-67. 
102. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64. 
103. 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
104. ld. at 454-55. 
105. Beech-Nut employed special agents and used special markings on its products to 
track down discounting dealers. ld. at 448-49. Wholesalers, distributors, and customers 
also assisted by reporting price-cutters to the company. Id. at 449. Beech-Nut in tum 
maintained and distributed a list of price-cutters and those who sold to them so that 
middlemen could cut off the discounter's supply of the goods. ld. at 450. Upon receipt 
of promises to abandon disapprov~d practices, Beech-Nut would reinstate those dealers 
who had been cut off. ld. at 450-51. 
106. ld. at 455. 
107. ld. 
1991] 19 
prices fixed by it from obtaining its goods."I08 As a result, the 
Court concluded that the activities violated the Sherman Act.109 
As the Modem Populist School gained influence during the De-
pression years, the Court took an increasingly conspiratorial view of 
business conduct; it began to focus more on whether the defend-
ant's activities constituted an agreement for antitrust purposes and 
less on the conduct's overall impact on trade. lIO Over time, less 
extreme cooperative and interactive behavior between manufactur-
ers and distributors became a sufficient evidentiary basis for finding 
an agreement in restraint of trade. In United States v. Bausch & Lomb 
Optical Co., 111 a 1944 case, the company merely refused to deal with 
wholesalers who continued to do business with retailers not adher-
ing to the resale price list. Il2 The Court found an unlawful combi-
nation because the result of the copmpany's policy was that many 
wholesalers did refuse to sell to offending retailers. l1S By 1960, 
even when similar policies proved unsuccessful and were aban-
doned, the Court, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., ·114 still found 
an agreement to fix prices. 1 15 Thus, the Court found combinations 
in restraint of trade even when price-discounting and competition 
were not in fact suppressed. 
The caselaw over the dozen years from Bausch & Lomb to Parke, 
Davis demonstrates that it became increasingly difficult for a manu-
facturer to establish that its actions to maintain prices were of an 
independent nature and thus protected by Colgate. Although mere 
acquiescence by dealers to manufacturers' price lists was not by it-
self sufficient to show an agreement, ultimately, any further action 
by either party could be construed as an illegal combination. As the 
Parke, Davis Court noted, "an unlawful combination is not just ... a 
price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination 
is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested 
prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a 
customer who will not observe his announced policy."1l6 
Parke, Davis was not the Modem Populist School's last effort to 
sharpen the focus on agreements. What many had considered the 
108. ld. 
109. Id. 
110. The marked change in the Court's approach during this period is not at all sur-
prising given the number of new Court appointments (eight between 1937 and 1942, 
though one, Justice Burns, retired after one year), and the general suspicion of private 
enterprise combined with the perceived need for government regulation and interven-
tion generated by the Depression experience. 
Ill. 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
112. ld. at 722. 
113. ld. at 723. 
114. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
115. The manufacturer initially induced its wholesalers to cut off offending retailers. 
When price-discounting persisted, the manufacturer, after trying other equally unsuc-
cessful tactics, abandoned its efforts to maintain prices, resumed supplying all the dis-
tributors' needs, and no longer requested that wholesalers stop supplying discounters. 
Id. at 36. 
116. Id. at 43. 
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effective demise of the Colgate doctrinel17 occurred in Albrecht v. Her-
ald CO'J 118 decided in 1968. In that case a newspaper carrier charged 
a price above the maximum set by the newspaper. Unlike the de-
fendants in Beech-Nut and Bausch & LombJ however, the newspaper 
did not seek to maintain prices through the cooperation of distribu-
tors to cut off supplies to the offending retailer. To the contrary, 
the carrier received all the newspapers he needed. Instead, the 
company went outside the vertical distribution chain between it and 
the carrier i~ order to service directly the overcharged customers 
desiring the lower price.11g The newspaper's behavior easily could 
be construed as independent action to serve its customers, conduct 
that ostensibly was permitted by Colgate. 120 
The Court, however, found that the defendant's competition with 
the carrier--hiring an independent subscription solicitor and turn-
ing the solicited customers over to another carrier-constituted an 
agreement between the defendant, the hired solicitor, and the other 
carrier for purposes of a Sherman Act vertical price-fixing viola-
tion.121 The Albrecht Court's reasoni~g that such conduct consti-
tuted an agreement was clearly in tension with·the Colgate holding. 
Colgate permitted manufacturers .to. terminate distributors for any 
reason, including the refusal to charge manufacturers' list prices.122 
AlbrechtJ however, found that a manufacturer's offers of cheaper 
117. See Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead'!, 37 ANTrrRUST LJ. 772. 772 
(1968) (asserting that the Colgate Doctrine is dead because it "has been criticized by a 
generation of the best lawyers and scholars in the country," and it is in conflict with 
other opinions, thereby making the decision no longer reliable as a statement of the 
law); William M. Isaac, Comment, Unilateral Refusals to Deal: King Colgate is Dead!. 30 
OHro ST. LJ. 537 (1969) (tracing the history of Colgate and showing its erosion over the 
years starting with A. Schrader's Son, Inc. and continuing until Albrecht and predicting. thus 
far erroneously, that a case following Albrecht would overrule Colgate). 
118. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
119. lei. at 147-48. 
120. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
121. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150. In Albrecht the defendant newspaper was displeased 
with the plaintiff independent carrier because he charged home-delivery customers a 
price higher than the newspaper's suggested retail price. lei. at 147. All carrier routes 
were subject to termination if their charges exceeded the advertised price. lei. Mter 
repeated warnings to the carrier, the newspaper exercised its contractual right to com-
pete by hiring a subscription solicitor and successfully wooing twenty-five percent of the 
customers away from the offending plaintiff. lei. The newspaper, however, still sold the 
plaintiff enough newspapers for his remaining route. lei. The defendant turned the 
solicited customers over to another carrier with the understanding that they would be 
returned to plaintiff if plaintiff gave up his overcharging practice. lei. at 147-48. 
It is interesting to note that Albrecht represents the first time the Court formally con-
sidered whether the setting of maximum prices in the vertical context came under the 
per se illegal rule. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 
(1951), may have been about vertical price-maximums. but·the Court chose to treat it as 
a horizontal agreement between two subsidiaries of a parent organization. lei. at 215. 
122. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanyi,ng text. 
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services through another carrier to the offending retailer's custom-
ers constituted an agreement for the purposes of the statute. 123 
Thus, although Colgate gave manufacturers the right to terminate 
dealers, Albrecht said that if the manufacturer tried to keep its cus-
tomers in such a situation by using a third party, the manufacturer's 
entire course of conduct would constitute an illegal combination for 
the purpose of fixing prices. Albrecht's ruling, therefore, effectively 
made it impossible for a manufacturer to terminate a dealer unless 
the manufacturer was willing to forgo its customers.124 
Furthermore, in a footnote, the Albrecht Court indicated that an 
illegal combination could be found from the plaintiff's acquiescence 
to defendant's price alone or, in the alternative, from the other cou-
riers' concurrence with the defendant's price list.125 In other words, 
though under Colgate the defendant bas the right to terminate those 
dealers who do not abide by the list price, under Albrecht the defend-
ant can be found guilty of per se vertical price-fixing if any of the 
dealers do charge the price list.126 In effect, after Albrecht, mere ac-
quiescence was no longer a safe harbor and the Colgate doctrine 
seemed dead.127 
123. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150. 
124. The question still left open is whether it would have been pennissible for the 
newspaper to serve its customers directly through its employees rather than through 
independent contractors. If such direct service is pennissible, there is an incentive for 
the newspaper to integrate forward vertically, that is, make its couriers its employees in 
order to control price without being subject to antitrust scrutiny. This result certainly 
would not please the Modem Populist School analysts. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379·81 (1967) (discussing an aversion to exactly that kind 
of integration). 
125. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6. 
126. [d. 
127. Even as recently as 1983, the validity of the Colgate doctrine after Albrecht was 
unclear. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 
256 (8th Cir. 1983), reflects that uncertainty. The conduct at issue was exactly the kind 
that Colgate originally was intended to protect against. Stover announced to every pro-
spective retailer its policy of refusing to sell to those retailers who would sell its products 
at less than its suggested minimum price. [d. at 257. It communicated these resale 
prices through price lists, invoices, order fonns. and pre-ticketing on all of its products. 
[d. Stover neither requested nor accepted any assurances from either prospective or 
existing dealers to adhere to resale prices. [d. It had, however, tenninated some dealers 
that had sold below the listed price. Id. Stover was charged by the FTC with unlawfully 
contracting and combining with dealers to fix resale prices. See id. The basis for the 
charge was the designated price list and the announced policy of tennination in cases of 
lower prices. See id. The administrative law judge dismissed the case because it found 
that Russell Stover fit "within all comers" of the Colgate doctrine. See id. The FTC re-
versed the administrative law judge's conclusion, finding that for statutory purposes, an 
agreement could be found in Stover's combination with those dealers who "unwillingly 
complied," and that Colgate only protected Stover's initial right to select retailers, but did 
not protect any right to base continued dealings on the retailer's pricing policy. See id. at 
258. Given Albrecht, the FTC's position was hardly unreasonable. 
Upon reviewing the arguments, the court of appeals reversed the FTC's finding and 
concluded that the case was in fact governed by Colgate. [d. at 260. The Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court may have intended to declare the Colgale doctrine 
dead, and that, in particular, footnote six of the Albrecht opinion certainly foreshadowed 
such a result, but agreed with the administrative law judge's finding that the facts in 
Slover were clearly within the traditional understanding of what the Colgate doctrine pre-
served. /d. at 259-60. In the panel's view, if the Supreme Court intended to overrule 
Col gale, it was up to that tribunal to do so. /d. at 260. 
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Thus, during the years that the Modem Populist philosophy dom-
inatedjudicial antitrust thinking, the Supreme Court moved as far as 
it could to erode all possible meaning from the Colgate doctrine, 
which protected a manufacturer's right, if acting independently, to 
terminate a dealer over displeasure with the dealer's prices. And so 
it remained until 1984, when the Supreme Court, upon reviewing 
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Spray-Rite Seroice Corp. v. Monsanto 
Co., 128 shifted direction once more. Not only did the Supreme 
Court resurrect the Colgate doctrine, but it gave it teeth by creating a 
new standard for establishing vertical price-fixing, one that would 
be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to meet. Whereas prior to Mon-
santo every effort was made by the Court to impute a price-fixing 
agreement when a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting dealer, 
after Monsanto the Court required the plaintiff to present evidence 
that would exclude the possibility that the manufacturer had acted 
independently.129 The Monsanto Court's turnaround reflected the 
erosion of Modem Populist influences as they gave way to the emer-
gence of efficiency analysis as the basis for antitrust decisions. 
IlL Vertical Nonprice Restraints: The Economic Analysis of 
Interhrand Versus Intrabrand Competition 
The newly announced standard in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Seroice 
Corp., 130 did not arise in a vacuum. It was the result of a separate 
line of cases regarding the antitrust treatment of vertical nonprice 
restraints, which already had shifted from the Modem Populist 
framework to the economic efficiency approach. The first time the 
Supreme Court dealt with vertical nonprice restraints directly and as 
conduct distinct from price restraints was in 1963 in White Motor Co. 
v. United States. 131 That case involved resale price maintenance. but 
it also implicated the manufacturer's restrictions on its dealers' ter-
ritory and customer base}32 The government. taking a 'Modern 
Populist perspective. argued that these restrictions, along with the 
resale price maintenance agreements. were per se violations of the 
Sherman Act.lsS White Motor asserted that the territorial restric-
tions in fact had strong pro competitive effects, allowing the dealers 
to focus on competing with other manufacturers rather than dis-
sipating their energies competing with each other and that outlaw-
ing territorial restrictions actually would reduce competition. White 
Motor further argued that the customer restrictions were necessary 
128. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), alf'J, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). . 
129. 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). 
130. 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 128-29. 
131. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
132. Id. at 261. 
133. Id. at 256. 
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for it to compete effectively with respect to price for certain high 
volume customers and therefore were not unreasonable restraints 
of trade in violation of antitrust laws. IS4 
Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the Court, took a position 
at variance with his usual views on corporate conduct. ISS Noting that 
this was the first case of territorial and customer restrictions in verti-
cal arrangements the Supreme Court had addressed,ls6 Justice 
Douglas acknowledged the possibility that such nonprice restraints 
might have strong pro competitive effects. IS7 He asserted, however, 
that the Court knew too little about customer and territorial restric-
tions ls8 and, that based on the "bare bones" of facts before it, was 
unable to reach a judgment without trial as to whether such restric-
tions should be treated as per se violations or analyzed under the 
rule of reason. IS9 Thus, although the Court did "not intimate any 
view of the merits"140 and remanded the case for a full hearing,l41 
White Motor represents the first time that the Court explicitly enter-
tained modern efficiency arguments to assist its decisionmaking in 
the vertical restraints area. White Motor, therefore, set the stage for a 
possible future ruling that nonprice restraints could be subject to 
rule of reason analysis that also would include modern efficiency 
considerations. 
The next time the Court addressed vertical nonprice restraints, 
however, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & CO.,142 it instead ap-
plied the Modern Populist standard of per se illegality.14s The dis-
sent objected, arguing for the application of economic efficiency 
considerations under the rule of reason.144 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Abe Fortas rejected the dissent's reasoning, asserting 
that nonprice restraints "are so obviously destructive of competition 
that their mere existence is enough" to constitute a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act.145 Thus, the majority, at that time, did not ac-
cept the White Motor economic efficiency conjecture that a rule of 
134. Id. at 257-59. 
135. See supra note 9. 
136. White Molar, 372 u.s. at 261. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. The case reached the Court on an appeal from summary judgment in favor 
of the government. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 264. 
141. Id. 
142. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
143. Id. at 375-76. 
144. Id. at 388 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only 
change in the Court's membership in the interim was that Justice Fortas replacedJustice 
Arthur Goldberg, a change that would not explain the Court's change in attitude be-
tween White lit/alar and Schwinn. Justices Brennan and Douglas changed their positions, 
joining Justice Fortas and two of the dissenters in White Motor to declare vertical non-
price restraints per se illegal. The third dissenter in White Motor, Justice Clark, took no 
part in the Schwinn decision but presumably would have joined the majority. The major-
ity distinguished facts in Schwinn on the rather dubious basis that Schwinn was a healthy, 
successful company, rendering its conduct per se illegal. Id. at 374. 
145. !d. at 379. In Schwinn the Court examined vertical nonprice restraints on cus-
tomers and territories after a full trial below. Based on that record, Justice Fortas' ma-
jority opinion distinguished between nonprice restraints when title had passed to the 
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reason analysis might be more appropriate for vertical nonprice re-
straints in general.146 
Reflecting both changes in the 'composition of the Cqurt147 and 
changes in societal and political acceptance of the use of ecol}omic 
reasoning to judge business activity, the Court in 1977 overruled 
Schwinn's application of the per se rule. In Continental T. v., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc.,148 the Court held that all vertical nonprice re-
straints were now subject to the rule of reason.149 The Sylvania 
Court, admonishing the Schwinn Court for not adhering to estab-
lished precedents for limiting the use of per se rules,150 engaged in 
fairly extensive and sophisticated economic analysis.1S1 For the first 
distributors and when it had not. Id. at 378-79. In the fonner instances, nonprice re-
straints were deemed per se illegal, whereas the latter were to be subject to the rule of 
reason. Id. at 379-80. 
As in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the Court's 
reasoning in Schwinn was based on the rules of property law prohibiting restraints on 
alienation. 388 U.S. at 380. In addition, the Court noted that most distributions of 
merchandise were based on sales and not consignment, and that pennitting restraints on 
alienation of goods would broadly suppress competition. Id. at 379-80. The property 
doctrines were not at issue in those cases when title had not passed. On grounds consis-
tent with the Modem Populist view, the Court concluded that a more flexible approach 
was appropriate. Id. at 380. Justice Fortas asserted that a per se rule in such a context 
could hamper the ability of smaller enterprises to compete with corporate giants and 
might lead to increased vertical integration at the distribution levels, a result contrary to 
the Modem Populist ideal. Id. . 
Although Dr. Mild vertical price restraint doctrine held that there was no Shennan 
Act violation when title had not passed, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text, the 
Court in Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964). decided that rule of reason analysis 
should be applied to detennine whether the lack of title transfer was a sham to cover-up 
illegal vertical price-fixing, id. at 18. Thus, Schwinn's treatment of nonprice restraints 
exactly paralleled the then-current law on price restraints. 
146. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. 
147. Of the Justices voting in the majority for per se illegality in Schwinn. only Justice 
Brennan remained on the Court when Sylvania was decided. Justice Brennan dissented 
in Sylvania, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, who had replaced Justice Clark. 
AlthoughJustice Clark, a member of the COUtts deciding both Schwinn and White Motor 
had not taken part in Schwinn, his dissent in White Motor advocating per se illegality for 
nonprice restraints indicates that he would have voted the same way as Justice Marshall 
did in Sylvania. The other members of the Schwinn majority, Chief Justice Warren, along 
withJustices Fortas, Black, and Douglas, had been replaced by Chief Justice Burger, and 
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, respectively. Justice Stewart, a dissenter in 
Schwinn, joined the newcomers to fonn the m~ority in Sylvania. Justice White, the only 
other Justice besides Justices Brennan and Stewart on the Court for both cases, took no 
part in Schwinn and concurred in the judgment in Sylvania. 
148. 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). Schwinn and Sylvania vividly illustrate the differences 
between the Warren Court's Modem Populist view of antitrust and the Burger Court's 
more moderate approach. Sylvania's overruling of Schwinn is one of the rare instances in 
antitrust law that the Court has overruled explicitly a relatively recent decision. 
149. Id. at 58-59. 
150. Id. at 51. The Sylvania Court quoted the standard for per se illegality set forth in 
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), which condemns activities 
per se if" 'their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable ••. without elaborate inquiry:" Sylvania, 
433 U.S. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5). 
151. 433 U.S. at 51-52 & n.19. 
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time, the Supreme Court accepted the economic distinction be-
tween interbrand and intrabrand competition, the former referring 
to competition between different manufacturers of competing 
goods and the latter referring to competition among dealers for the 
sale of one manufacturer's goods.I52 The Sylvania Court criticized 
the Schwinn opinion for focusing primarily on the restraints' impact 
on intrabrand competition without examining their effects on inter-
brand competition. 153 Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, 
concluded that even though vertical nonprice restraints may restrict 
intrabrand competition, they also often promote interbrand compe-
tition "by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies 
in the distribution of his product."154 He suggested that the manu-
facturer's interest in enhancing interbrand competition would cur-
tail any anticompetitive effect that the restraints could have on 
intrabrand competition. I55 Furthermore, he noted, the manufac-
turer's efforts to engage in interbrand competition corresponded to 
the public interest,I56 and the enhancement of interbrand competi-
tion was the primary goal of antitrust law. I57 Thus, nonprice re-
straints have to be examined under the rule of reason to determine 
whether they are, in fact, in furtherance of interbrand competition. 
The Court's reasoning in Sylvania reflects a wholesale adoption of 
the modem economic efficiency approach.I5S 
IV. Monsanto and the Free Rider Problem 
Deciding that some vertical restraints could have a predominately 
pro competitive effect, and placing nonprice restraints into the rule 
152. Id. at 52 n.19. 
153. Id. at 51-52. 
154. /d. at 54. 
155. /d. at 54-55. 
156. Id. at 56 n.24. Justice Powell acknowledged that this finding is controversial. Id. 
at 56. 
157. Id. at 52 n.19. 
158. Because antitrust law is concerned with regulating markets, antitrust decisions 
always have applied some form of economic reasoning. There also are cases throughout 
antitrust history in which the Court's economic analysis would stand up against modern 
economic efficiency and market analysis. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 
246 U.S. 231 (1918). But there is a considerable distinction between the modern effi-
ciency and market analysis and the economic analysis of industrial concentration that 
was so popular from the 1940s to the 1970s. The latter, more formally known as struc-
tural analysis, applied economic statistics to measure degrees of concentration and 
profit rates. Structuralists' antitrust conclusions, however, determined whether the sta-
tistics indicated an industrial structure that deviated from the atomistic paradigm of the 
Modern Populist School. There was little room for consideration of whether the devia-
tions might be due to positive efficiency results, such as economies of scale, or innova-
tive technology or organization. Nor was there much analysis of whether the market was 
subject to competitive forces in spite of high levels of concentration and barriers to new 
entry. Efficiency and competitive market analysis has been developed relatively recently, 
and the Chicago School has had a major influence on its growth. It is this more sophisti-
cated and subtle reasoning that this Article refers to as modern efficiency and market 
analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the debate surrounding the Sylvania decision, 
see Kurt A. Strasser, Vertical Tenitorial Restrail/ts After Sylvania: A Policy .-1l/a(\'Sis and Pro-
posed .\'ew Rule, 1977 DUKE LJ. 775. 
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of reason category,159 the Court opened the door to a legal imbro-
glio. Although as the Court noted in Continental T. v., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 160 the manufacturer may be imposing these restraints 
on retailers to enhance its competitive position relative to other 
manufacturers,161 typically the vertical nonprice restraints are cosdy 
to the retailer. When the restraints require the retailer to provide 
services beyond the mere selling of goods, a retailer may attempt to 
avoid restraint-related costs by not providing those services. In 
some circumstances, such a retailer can become a free rider,162 a 
phenomenon that has been the focus of much attention since the 
Sylvania decision.16s 
A classic example of free riding occurs when full service retailers, 
in response to manufacturers' efforts to increase sales, incur the 
costs of training personnel to assist customers in determining their 
product needs. A free riding retailer avoids these costs by forgoing 
sales experts, which pemits it to discount the product's price while 
still maintaining reasonable profits. If a free rider is in the vicinity, 
the customer can go to the full service store to derive the benefits of 
the expert personnel but then purchase the product from the dis-
counter; the discounter thus takes a ufree ride" at the expense of the 
full service store. Because of the latter's forgone sales, the 
probability of recouping expenses incurred in providing the trained 
personnel is reduced. As a result, the full service store loses the 
incentive to provide those services that the manufacturer views as 
beneficial to its overall sales level. In such instances, the manufac-
turer may wish to terminate the free-riding dealer. 
The judicial difficulties the free rider issue creates arise when a 
terminated discounting dealer files an antitrust action against the 
manufacturer. The question facing the trier of fact is whether the 
dealer was terminated because of its price discounting activities or 
because ofits failure to adhere to nonprice requirements. If the for-
mer is true and an agreement can be found (say, between the manu-
facturer and other dealers), then the manufacturer's action is per se 
illegal. l64 If the latter is the case, then the manufacturer's restraints 
are to be judged under the rule of reason.165 Because almost all 
restraints have a price impact, and the distinction between price and 
nonprice is often more apparent than real, the Sylvania holding 
alone was not sufficient to ensure that vertical nonprice restraints 
would bejudged under the rule of reason. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
) 59. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text. 
160. 433 U.S. 36 {1977}. 
161. Id. at 54. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68. 
163. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text. 
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Seroice Corp., 166 decided in 1984, focused precisely on that concern: 
[Ilt is of considerable importance that independent action by the 
manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be 
distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since under present 
law the latter are subject to per se treatment. . .. If an inference 
of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evi-
dence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunci-
ated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.167 
Monsanto attempted to avoid the erosion of Sylvania and United 
States v. Colgate & Co. 168 by weakening the standards set out in Al-
brecht v. Herald Co. 169 for showing a price-fixing conspiracy. 170 It did 
so by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer's actions 
could not have been independent. l7l 
In Monsanto the manufacturer terminated a price discounter fol-
lowing complaints by other dealers.172 The question before the 
Court was whether those facts were sufficient to establish a vertical 
'price-fixing conspiracy.173 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
said no: "Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the 
existence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination came 
about 'in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize perfectly 
legitimate conduct."174 The Court then established a new eviden-
tiary standard, one requiring that plaintiffs' evidence "tend[] to ex-
clude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated 
distributors were acting independently."175 The Court required the 
plaintiff to establish that "the manufacturer and others 'had a con-
scious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an un-
lawful objective.' "176 
The Monsanto Court did not abandon the per se rule for vertical 
price-fixing agreements entirely; it merely made finding them more 
difficult. Because other evidence in Monsanto established the exist-
ence of an agreement to maintain prices and to terminate the dis-
counter for its pricing activities, the Court concluded that the 
166. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
167. Id. at 763. 
168. 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
169. 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. 
170. "On a claim of concerted price fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evi-
dence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an agreement." 465 
U.S. at 763. 
171. Id. at 768. 
172. Id. at 758-59. 
173. Id. at 759. As long as the case involves a manufacturer imposing a price on a 
dealer, the Court does not seem to distinguish between whether the initiative to impose 
a price originated with the manufacturer or other dealers. But see Business Elecs. Corp. 
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp, 485 U.S. 717,736 (1988) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (arguing that 
when a manufacturer is responding to other dealers' complaints, the legality of its ac-
tions should be judged under horizontal price-fixing standards). The requirements for 
inferring illegal horizontal price-fixing agreements are not as strict as those for vertical 
price-fixing agreements. See, e.g., id. at 734. 
174. Jl-fonsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
175. Id. at 764. 
176. /d. (quoting Edward]. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 
(3d Cir. 1980), ccrt. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981». 
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manufacturer's termination was in fact per se illegal.!77 Resisting 
arguments by both antitrust scholars and the Solicitor General178 to 
move vertical price-fixing wholesale into the rule of reason category. 
the Monsanto Court chose to keep alive the rule of per se illegality 
for that activity. 
Thus, although up}tolding per se illegal treatment for vertical 
price-fixing, the Monsanto Court also articulated a stricter standard 
for proving such conduct: the evidence must tend to exclude the 
possibility ofindependent action.179 The Monsanto Court wanteq to 
reduce the number of cases that would be considered per se illegal, 
but what would occur in those cases escaping per'se illegal treat-
ment is not clear. This determination hinges on whether the Court 
intended its new standard for establishing an agreement to apply to 
vertical restraints in general, or to vertical price restraints alone. 
One interpretation is that the new standard applied only to verti-
cal price agreements. If the Monsanto Court's rule was meant to ap-
ply only to price-fixing agreements, and some other lower standard 
would be sufficient to show a nonprice agreement, then a plaintiff's 
failure to prove a price-fixing conspiracy would not preclude the de-
fendant's conduct from being analyzed under the rule of reason as a 
nonprice restraint. Under this interpretation, Monsanto expands the 
scope of the rule of reason by narrowing the reach of per se illegal 
categorization, a view consistent with most scholars' understanding 
of the case. ISO 
An alternative interpretation is that the Court intended the new 
stringent standard to apply equally to price and nonprice restraints. 
If this interpretation is accurate, any conduct that fails to meet the 
standard for price-fixing agreements necessarily would. fail to meet 
the standard for nonprice restraints. As a result, large numbers of 
vertical agreements would be neither per se illegal nor subject to the 
rule of reason. Although consistent with the goal of relieving manu-
facturers of excessive antitrust concerns about their vertical re-
straints, such an effect appears to be in tension with the Court's 
177. Iff. at 768. 
178. See id. at 761 n.7. 
179. It!. at 751. 
180. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Attorney's Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the Sys-
tem Fairer, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 51,71 (1988) (arguing that "little room remains for 
per se analysis" because of the Court's efforts in Monsanto (as well as in Sylvania and 
Sharp»; George A. Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 418, 433 
(1985) (arguing that "[t]he Monsanto Court sought an evidentiary standard •.. to pre-
serve the rules of thumb inherited from prior decisions: price agreements are per se 
illegal [and] vertical nonprice agreements are subject to the rule of reason"); Earl E. 
Pollock, Vertical Restraints and the Secularization oJ Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 951, 953 (1987) 
(stating that "as Monsanto illustrates, it is ... possible to give obeisance to a per se rule 
while cutting back sharply on its scope and bite"). 
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expressed concern of preserving the Sylvania doctrine, lSI which opts 
for rule of reason scrutiny of manufacturers' conduct rather than no 
court examination whatsoever. IS2 
The most likely explanation is that the Monsanto Court was not 
aware of the ambiguities in its decision, and did not intend to make 
an explicit policy choice regarding the extent of the application of 
the new standard. The first alternative,183 however, seems more in 
line with the Court's expressed goal of maintaining judicial supervi-
sion over manufacturers' vertical restraints. 
The Monsanto Court's discussion of independent action further 
supports the inference that the standard for· finding an agreement 
should be stricter for price-fixing activities than for nonprice re-
straints. The Court intimated that nonprice activities could consti-
tute evidence of independent action for purposes of determining 
whether there was a price-fixing agreement.1S4 Ifa manufacturer's 
termination of a dealer for failing to abide by nonprice restraints 
constitutes independent action, then, by definition, that action will 
not satisfy the agreement requirement for finding an illegal price 
restraint. If the evidentiary standard for finding an agreement is the 
same for both price and nonprice restrictions, then those nonprice 
restraints cannot satisfy the agreement requirement in the nonprice 
category either, thereby making all nonprice restraints legal by defi-
nition. Clearly, this result is inconsistent with the Monsanto Court's 
expressed intent to preserve the Sylvania doctrine of subjecting non-
price restraints to rule of reason scrutiny.IS5 
It is most likely that if the Court had reflected explicitly on these 
issues, it would have created a separate, lower, standard for finding 
an agreement for nonprice restraints to ensure rule of reason evalu-
ation. If this is an accurate reading of the case, then Monsanto obvi-
ates the concern that manufacturers' legitimate nonprice activities 
with a price impact will be viewed by juries as a per se illegal price 
restraint, a concern subsequently expressed by the Court in Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. lS6 It is, therefore, questiona-
ble whether Sharp'S additional requirements for finding a price 
agreementlS7 were necessary or even appropriate. 
Regardless of the precise nature of the holding, Monsanto reflects 
the emerging dominance of rule of reason efficiency analysis to eval-
uate antitrust concerns. Whether Sharp and ARCO v. USA Petroleum 
Co. 188 continued in that same vein is subject to question. 
181. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763 (indicating that the new evidentiary standard being 
formulated was intended to avoid the "serious ero[sion]" of Sylvania and Colgate). 
182. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). 
183. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
184. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
185. Id. 
186. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
187. See infra text accompanying notes 206-12. 
188. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). 
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V. The Road to Per Se Legality 
A. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.-The 
Opinion 
Just as Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 'S189 stringent eviden-
tiary standard promoted the Court's desire in Continental T.v., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc. 190 to permit manufacturers to use nonprice re-
straints to assure better services,191 the Court's opinion in Business 
Electronics Co. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 192 claimed to do the same by 
imposing a substantive requirement that "a vertical restraint is not 
illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price 
levels."193 
In Sharp, the manufacturer had two appointed dealers in the 
Houston area, Business Electronics Corporation (BEG) and Hart-
well. Both dealers discounted Sharp's prices, though BEC did so 
more consistently and more extensively. In responding to Hart-
well's complaints about BEC's discounting, Sharp stated that it 
could not dictate BEe's prices. Hartwell then threatened to discon-
tinue being Sharp's dealer if Sharp did not terminate BEC. Sharp 
subsequently terminated BEC, which then filed suit charging Sharp 
with per se illegal vertical price-fixing.194 At trial, one of the judge's 
interrogatories to the jury stated that if the jury found an agreement 
or understanding betvveen Sharp and Hartwell to terminate BEC be-
cause of the latter's price-cutting, the activity was unlawful, even if 
(as the judge explained) the agreement was aimed at eliminating al-
leged evils ofprice-cutting,195 Thejury verdict in favor ofBEC was 
reversed and the case remanded by the Fifth Circuit, which con-
cluded that the interrogatory and instructions were erroneous.196 
The Fifth Circuit held that "to render illegal per se a vertical agree-
ment between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a second 
dealer, the first dealer 'must expressly or impliedly agree to set its 
prices at some level, though not a specific one. The distributor can-
not retain complete freedom to set whatever price it chooses.' "197 
The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-2 split, affirmed. 198 
189. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
190. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
191. For a discussion of the relationship between nonprice restraints and services. 
see infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
192. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
193. Id. at 735-36. 
194. Id. at 721. BEC filed suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
195. See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 721-22. 
196. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212. 1220 (5th Cir. 
1986). a./J'd, 485 U.S. 718 (1988). 
197. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 722-23 (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp .• 
780 F.2d 1212. 1218 (5th Cir. 1986), alf'd, 485 U.S. 718 (1988». 
198. 485 U.S. 717. 
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justice Scalia, writing for a m~ority that included justices across 
the ideological spectrum,199 first emphasized that, in general, the 
rule of reason was the approach to be used to resolve antitrust ques-
tions. Per se rules were the exceptions and were to be applied "only 
for 'conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive: "200 That category 
was limited to conduct " , "that would always or almost always tend 
to restrict competition and decrease output." , "201 Although the 
majority once again maintained, on that basis, that vertical price re-
straints were still per se illegal,202 it also reaffirmed the conclusions 
in Sylvania and Monsanto that nonprice restraints did not offer the 
same pernicious anticompetitive threat because they had "real po-
tential to stimulate interbrand competition."203 Because the result-
ing interbrand competition would adequately safeguard any 
intrabrand competition concerns and interbrand competition was 
"the primary concern of .the antitrust laws, "204 it was critical that 
vertical non price restraints be precluded from per se illegal catego-
rization and judged under the rule of reason.205 
Applying these principles to the case at bar,justice Scalia went on 
to declare that there had been no showing that agreements between 
manufacturers and dealers to terminate price cutters, without agree-
ments as to price, almost always had the restrictive effect on compe-
tition and output that mandated per se illegal treatment.206 Even 
though one of the dangers of vertical price-fixing conduct is its po-
tential to facilitate horizontal price-fixing, or cartelization,207 Justice 
Scalia argued that absent an agreement on price levels, a manufac-
turer's incentive and ability to cartelize is reduced significantly.208 
Harkening back to the Monsanto Court's concern that judicial mis-
perceptions might prevent manufacturers from protecting against 
free riders,209 Justice Scalia emphasized, once again, that in many 
cases in which there are nonprice restraints, there will be an effect 
199. The majority was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, 
O'Connor, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not partici· 
pate. Justices Stevens and White dissented. In the antitrust context, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor tend to be sympathetic to a market or efficiency 
approach, though their sympathy is not necessarily as strong as the Chicago School's. 
See supra note 6. Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other hand, traditionally held 
antitrust views consistent with the Warren Court, which represented the most sophisti-
cated form of the Modem Populist perspective: the Structuralist approach. See supra 
note 6. Justice Blackmun does not seem to have a clearly identifiable antitrust 
perspective. 
200. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 723 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 50 (1977». 
201. Id. (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Print-
ing Co., 427 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985) (quoting BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. I, 19-20 (1979))). 
202. Id. at 724. 
203. Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.I9 
(1977». 
204. Id. at 726. 
205. /d. at 725. For an analysis ofinterbrand versus intraband competition, see supra 
notes 130·58 and accompanying text. 
206. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 726·27. 
207. Id. at 725-26. 
208. /d. at 726-27. 
209. 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984); see supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text. 
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on price, and that "[i]n the vast majority of cases, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for the manufacturer to convince ajury that its mo-
tivation was to ensure adequate services."210 As a result, 
manufacturers would avoid engaging in efficient business strategy 
because of the possibility of antitrust liability.211 Finally, Justice 
Scalia rejected the argument-that agreements as to piice levels typi-
cally follow from the termination of a price-cutter and thus required 
a per se rule. Such a theory was "simply incompatible 'with the con-
clusion of GTE Sylvania and Monsanto" that manufacturers often are 
motivated by a desire to provide better services and to eliminate 
free riding.212 Therefore the Court announced a new rule for as-
sessing vertical restrictions: without an agreement on price or price 
levels, the conduct was not per se illegal. 
B. The Sharp Critique 
Justice Scalia's concern t4~t manufactu.ters would be inhibited 
from engaging in economically efficient noiiprice restraints because 
of·the possibility of a jury focusing only on the almost inevitable 
price impact of such conduct, appears ill founded in view of Mon-
santo's already stringent standard for determining the existence of 
price-fixing agreements.213 Monsanto requires that the jury find no 
possibility of the manufacturer acting independently in order to 
conclude that the defendant's conduct constituted an agreement for 
price-fixing purposes.214 Because, implicitly, Monsanto also requires 
that the jury consider whether any nonprice activities can constitute 
such independent action,215 it would be very difficult for juries to 
find price-fixing agreements when nonprice activities are involved. 
This conclusion is true reg(!rdless of whether th~ Monsanto Court 
. created one standard or twO.216 If oniy one standard for finding an 
agreement applies to both price and nonprice activity, then all or 
almost all nonprice restraints would escape antitrust scrutiny. If avo 
standards exist, nonprice activities necessarily would fall into the 
rule of reason category. In either case, nonprice activities would es-
cape per se illegal categorization, which was the goal Justice Scalia 
claimed to seek. 
Justice Scalia's fears of undue condemnation of manufacturers' 
210. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 727. This is because "price cutting and some measure of 
service cutting usually go hand in hand." /d. at 727-28. 
211. fd. at 728. 
212. fd. at 731. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 162-85. 
214. Some nonprice restraints in which the price restraint component predominates 
probably would, however, still be found to be per se ilIe~l. . 
215. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984): see supra 
notes 175-76 and accompanying text. . 
216. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
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vertical restrictions would be valid only if there was one standard 
and it was an easy standard to meet. In other words, if there was a 
low standard for proving the existence of a nonprice agreement and 
the jury could use that standard when deciding whether the price 
effects of the conduct constituted price-fixing, then much nonprice 
activity would be at risk of being declared illegal. This could not 
occur, however, because it would contradict Monsanto's requirement 
of a very high standard for showing price-fixing agreements.217 
Thus, the scenario Justice Scalia fears is not possible when ajury is 
instructed properly under the Monsanto evidentiary rule. Moreover, 
when the nonprice activities fail to satisfy the higher, price agree-
ment standard, the activities automatically will fall under rule of rea-
son scrutiny, a result Justice Scalia purportedly approves.218 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia proceeded to erect another safeguard 
to prevent juries from finding per se illegal price-fixing, one that not 
only is unnecessary but is overreaching as well. Although Justice 
Scalia gave the appearance of moving a substantial part of price-
fixing cases into the rule of reason category, an impression that 
most antitrust scholars hold,219 closer scrutiny reveals that Justice 
Scalia actually may have created a de facto per se legal category for 
some, if not all, vertical price restraints. 
That many scholars have interpreted Sharp as expanding the rule 
of reason treatment for vertical nonprice restraints while narrowing 
the possibility of per se illegal treatment for vertical price restraints 
is understandable. After all, Justice Scalia himself stated that the 
purpose of Sharp is "to resolve a conflict . . . regarding the proper 
dividing line between the rule that vertical price restraints are illegal 
per se and the rule that vertical nonprice restraints are to be judged 
under the rule of reason. "220 Indeed, the entire opinion revolves 
around the importance of limiting per se illegal categorization and 
maintaining the rule of reason as the norm. Justice Scalia's lan-
guage connotes that all vertical restraints fall on a continuum be-
tween pure price and pure nonprice restraints, and that the only 
question is where to draw the line between per se illegal treatment 
and rule of reason treatment for any particular restraint. Because 
Justice Scalia's expressed intent is to limit the extent of per se illegal 
categories,221 it is not unreasonable to conclude that the shift in the 
dividing line to narrow the spectrum of per se illegal candidates au-
tomatically expands the spectrum of rule of reason candidates so as 
to encompass those no longer subject to per se condemnation. 
This perception, however, is not accurate. Because a restraint is 
no longer considered a price restraint for antitrust purposes, and 
therefore is not per se illegal, does not mean that it can automati-
cally be treated as a nonprice restraint to be subject to the rule of 
217. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
218. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). 
219. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
220. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 720. 
221. [d. at 716. 
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reason. Under Justice Scalia's new standards, it is quite possible 
(and the facts in Sharp are a good example) that a restraint's sole 
function is to control price and yet it will not be considered vertical 
price-fixing.222 As a result, in cases where there is no nonprice com-
ponent, manufacturers not only will escape per se condemnation, 
but also rule of reason scrutiny. In effect, Justice Scalia created a 
new category of per se legal price restraints that would not be sub-
ject to any antitrust scrutiny.22s This result is perfectly consistent 
with the Chicago School's view on vertical restraint regulation: that 
manufacturers should be allowed to conduct their business with 
their distributors unfettered by the prospect of antitn,lst chastise-
ment.224 Furthermore, as a practical matter, manufacturers easily 
can modulate their conduct (by not mentioning specific price levels 
with their cartelizing compatriots)225 so that any price-fixing efforts 
automatically will fall into this implicit per se legal category. The 
net effect of Justice Scalia's new standard is not so much to enlarge 
the scope of rule of reason applications (though, to some extent, 
that end is achieved), but to eliminate from the continuum alto-
gether a large class of cases involving vertical price-fixing conduct, 
including. those that almost all scholars would agree should be sub-
ject to antitrust condemnation. 
C. ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co.-Furthering the Path 
The deregulation of vertical price restraints that the Sharp opinion 
indicates226 is continued by the Court's opinion inARCO v. U8..A Pe-
troleum CO.,227 particularly when read in conjunction with Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.228 The Court inARCO held 
for the first time that a competitor cannot claim antitrust ittiury in 
those cases of vertical price-fixing that set maximum price limits, 
unless the competitor can demonstrate that the price-maximums 
were predatory in nature.229 The ARCO decision, in itself, created 
222. See. e.g.. id. at 739 (Stevens.J .• dissenting) (demonstrating that the manufacturer 
did not impose nonprice restraints). 
223. Because its focus was on a very clear issue of non price restraints. by not consid-
ering those circumstances in which no nonprice dimensions were involved. Monsanto 
also may have inadvertently created a category of per se legal vertical price restraints. At 
the very least. Sharp greatly expanded this category by allowing unambiguous vertical 
price restraints to enter into this category merely because they do not contain agree-
ments as to specific price levels. 
224. See supra note 6. 
225. "If a [terminated price discounter] wishes to have a price-fixing case heard in 
court it must ••• prove ... that the price fixers agreed to set a specific price. [rhat]. I 
contend. is an almost impossible standard to meet. Only fools fix prices before wit-
nesses." 137 CONGo REC. 3390 (daily cd. Oct. 15. 1991) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
226. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. 
227. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). 
228. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
229. ARGO. 110 S. Ct. at 1891-92. The requirement of predatory priclI'g to establish 
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another barrier to vertical price-fixing regulation by limiting the 
reach of private actions. The strength of this barrier, however, de-
pends on the Court's definition of predatory pricing, which, in turn, 
depends on the interpretion of the Court's ruling, four years earlier, 
in i\l/atsushita. Although Matsushita did not address vertical price-fix-
ing issues,23o its analysis of whether a competitor suffered antitrust 
injury in the face of horizontal price-fixing conspiracies is precisely 
on point. 
The Matsushita Court was reviewing the Third Circuit's decision 
reversing in part the district court's order granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant.231 In reversing the Third Circuit, 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact for trial on the charge of a conspiracy 
to engage in predatory pricing.232 In Matsushita, the Court defined 
predatory pricing as charging prices below cost with the intent of 
driving one's competitors out of the market.233 Included in that def-
inition was the assumption that once the competitors were driven 
out, the predatory firm would engage in monopoly pricing, that is, 
charge prices well above those that would have been established in a 
competitive market. The Court noted that a period of monopoly 
pricing was essential for the predatory firm to recoup its losses, as 
well as to be able to take abnormally high profits in order to make 
the venture worth the risk.234 
The majority applied the Chicago School's economic argument 
that a predatory pricing strategy could not be successful because the 
a plaintiff's antitrust injury usually was used in merger or monopoly cases. More re-
cently, some court of appeals cases, such as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in USA Petro-
leum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), rel/'tf, 110 S. 
Ct. 1884 (1990), and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super 
Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989), started requiring evidence of predatory 
pricing in vertical restraint cases. The Supreme Court subsequently used ARCO to vali-
date this procedure. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1891-92. For a discussion of predatory pric-
ing, see infra note 232. 
230. Matsushita involved a suit by several American manufacturers against severalJap-
anese manufacturers, charging the Japanese with, among other things, horizontal price-
fixing in the United States and charging prices that were predatorily low, so as to un-
fairly drive the American manufacturers out of the American market. 475 U.S. at 577-
82. 
231. Id. at 580. 
232. Some define predatory pricing broadly as "pricing below an appropriate mea-
sure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing 
competition in the long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 
117 (1986); see also Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 206 (stating that "[a] predatory 
strategy is any course of conduct by a dominant firm designed to drive out, discipline or 
set back competitors by acts that, but for their anticompetitive impact, would not be 
economically sensible for the dominant firm"). There is much difference of opinion, 
however, on what specifically constitutes predatory behavior. For a good discussion of 
various definitions of predatory pricing, see Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117 n.12. The plaintiffs 
in Matsushita, who were competitors of the defendants, also charged them with a con-
spiracy to set minimum prices above the competitive levels. The Court first noted that 
competitors could not recover antitrust damages in those circumstances. Even though it 
noted that such activity was illegal as horizontal price-fixing, the effect not only caused 
the plaintiff-competitors no harm, but it actually benefitted them, thus precluding them 
from suing to recover for antitrust injury. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 582-83. 
233. ,\Jatsushita, 475 U.S. at 584 n.8. 
234. !d. at 588-90. 
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defendant firms would not be able to engage in the necessary mo-
nopoly pricing.235 As soon as prices rose, competitors would enter 
the market, thereby driving the price back down to competitive 
levels. Therefore, any firm engaging in such activity was in a finan-
cially losing venture, and would either cease such efforts or be 
driven out ofbusiness.236 The lesson to b~ drawn from this analy-
sis, the Court concluded, is that firms are too sophisticated to at-
tempt to compete in such a foolhardy manner. and that therefore 
any ficin engaging in price-cutting activities is unlikely to be engag-
ing in predatory pricing.237 On this basis, the Court, in a rare 
move,238 granted a conditional summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant.239 The Matsushita Court did not completely close the 
door to the possibility of predatory pricing, but the evidentiary bur-
den it required to establish a sufficient question of fact to go to trial, 
in effect, made it almost a matter of law that predatory pricing did 
not exist. Given the analysis in Matsushita, it is practically impossi-
ble, after ARGO, for a competitor to sue a vertical price-fi."{er, 
thereby removing one more avenue of antitrust scrutiny. 
If the Sharp Court intended to create a category of per se legal 
vertical price-fixing,240 it can be seen as reflecting the Chicago 
School view that vertical restraints in general should not be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.241 One would expect that decisions guided by 
this principle would tend, in subsequent cases involving vertical re-
straints, to develop standards designed to facilitate that result. 
ARGO, therefore, can be seen. at least with regard to vertical price 
restraints, a.s another step in the direction of per se legality.242 
VI Econom~~ Analysis . 
If it is true that Business Electronics Gorp. v. Sh'arp E{ectronics Gorp. 243 
235. Id. at 590·93. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 589-90. 
238. See, e.g., Pollerv. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (opining 
that "summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation 
where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the al-
leged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot"). 
239. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598. The Court stated that on remand, the Third Circuit 
was free to consider any other evidence that might create an issue of material fact. Id. at 
597. The standards the Court imposed for such a finding, however, were essentially 
impossible to meet. The Court further ruled that if no such evidence existed, summary 
judgment must be granted. Id. at 598. 
240. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
242. Moreover, the Court in ARCO implied that in the future, the Court may remove 
from the pel; se illegal category vertical price-fixing agreements setting maximum prices. 
without regard to whether a nonprice restraint is involved. 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1889 n.5 
(1990). 
243. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
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and ARGO v. USA Petroleum GO.244 reflect the Court's movement to-
wards per se legality for vertical restraints in general,245 then one 
must ask if the economic theories asserted to justify this move are 
valid. Proponents of per se legality argue that a firm's motive to 
maximize profits through vertical restraints is merely guided by ef-
forts to compete horizontally at the manufacturer level; in other 
words, to engage in interbrand competition.246 The Chicago School 
asserts that because manufacturers are driven by competitive forces, 
the vertical restraints they impose must be in response to those 
forces and therefore, necessarily are procompetitive as well as eco-
nomically efficient. If that were not the case, then the restraints 
would fail to enhance profits, and the firms would abandon them. 
The restraints' retention is proof in itself of their pro competitive 
impact. Thus, Chicago School proponents argue, the marketplace 
effectively polices manufacturers' conduct to ensure competitive be-
havior, rendering antitrust scrutiny of vertical restrictions not only 
unnecessary, but also a waste of society'S resources and a harmful 
impediment to firms' efficient activities as well.247 
The critical link in this analysis is the presumption that any effort 
on the manufacturer's part to maximize profits through vertical re-
straints must be economically efficient and pro competitive. The 
traditional argument against the Chicago model is that firms can use 
vertical restraints to facilitate cartelization; that is, horizontal price-
fixing, at either the manufacturer or dealer level. 248 If cartelization 
occurs, market prices are maintained artificially above the competi-
tive level-clearly an anticompetitive result.249 Debates addressing 
the validity of the cartelization concern focus both on the likelihood 
of its occurrence and on the social costs of either overly broad 
prohibitions or excessive permissiveness toward vertical price re-
straints.25o Furthermore, some question remains whether or not 
cartelization, if it occurs, cannot be remedied adequately through 
antitrust scrutiny of horizontal restraints, thereby obviating the 
need to examine any vertical conduct.251 In these debates, both the 
Modern Populists and the Chicago School proponents advocate po-
lar positions of per se rules for vertical price restraints: the former 
244. 110 S. Ct. 1884. 
245. See supra notes 189-242 and accompanying text. 
246. See, e.g., supra note 28. 
247. See BORK, supra note 4, at 280-98. 
248. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 66, at 137; Lawrence A. Sullivan, TheJustice Department 
Guidelines on Mergers and Vertical Restraints: A Critique, 16 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 
18-19 (1984). 
249. See infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying 
note 196. 
250. Compare, e.g., Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy, 1985 CONTEMP. 
POL'y ISSUES 9, 15 ("[I)f anticompetitive instances were frequent but hard to prove, 
neither a rule of reason nor a rule of per se legality may be appropriate.") with Posner, 
supra note 28, at 8 (arguing that declaring "purely vertical restrictions on distribution" 
legal would create a judicially manageable standard compared to the rule of reason or 
the illegal rule). 
251. See ilifra text accompanying notes 273-75. 
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advocate per se illegality252 and the latter advocate per se legality. 253 
At the crux of the discourse is the assumption, on both sides, that 
cartelization is the primary means through which an industry, popu-
lated by more than one firm, can engage in industry monopoly pric-
ing, that is, price above competitive levels. Recent developments in 
economic theory show that manufacturers' ability to distribute 
goods through retailers (as opposed to selling directly to consum-
ers) induce the manufacturers and the retailers to engage in non-
cartelizing strategic pricing behavior-conduct that opens up the 
. possibility of industry-wide monopoly retail pricing without any 
assistance from cartelization efforts.254 An evaluation of both per se 
legalization and per se illegalization of vertical price restraints in 
this context demonstrates that extreme antitrust rules can create im-
pediments to certain market forces that otherwise would counter-
mand the high industry pricing levels arising from the distributors' 
strategic (and legal) pricing activities. As will be seen, in those retail 
market environments in which per se legality erects significan~ an-
ticompetitive barriers, the market force impeded is the underap-
predated intrabrand price competition255 that the Modern Populists 
have argued so vigorously to protect.256 On the other hand, per se 
illegality inhibits the demonopolization of prices that otherwise 
would occur when the manufacturers' optimal profit-maximizing 
strategy is to set price maximums for retailers, forcing them to lower 
prices. In some instances, the demonopolization of retail prices 
even may require that manufacturers enter into agreements with 
each other to set and enforce these maximum retail prices. Cur-
rently, such conduct would violate not only laws against vertical 
price restraints but also those prohibiting horizontal price re-
straints, and would be treated as illegal per se.257 
The market structures analyzed in the noncartel context are n0t 
252. See supra note 67. 
253. See supra note 28. 
254. For recent developments in economic analysis of manufacturer's strategic be-
havior, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Marketing Agency as a 
DeviceJor Facilitating Collusion, 16 RAND J. ECON. 269 (1985); Giacomo Bonanno &John 
Vickers, Vertical Separation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 257 (l98~); Michael L. Katz, Vertical Con-
tractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & 
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Patrick Rey &Joseph Stiglitz, Vertical Restraints and Produ-
cers' Competition, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 561 (l988); Greg Shaffer, Capturing Strategic Rent: 
Full-Line Forcing, Brand Discounts, Aggregate Rebates, And Maximum Resale Price Maintenance, 
39 J. INDUS. ECON. (1991); Thomas J. Hoerger & Andrew W. Horowitz, Retailers as 
Buffers: Substitutability and Optimal Retail Structure (Jan. 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with The George Washington Law Review). 
255. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-59 (criticiz-
ing the Court's decision in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), 
for inappropriately emphasizing intrabrand competition at the expense of interbrand 
competition). 
256. See infra notes 282-94 and accompanying text. 
257. See infra notes 295-310 and accompanying text. 
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obscure artifacts created by economic ivory tower ponderings. They 
represent those instances when it is in the manufacturer's interest to 
use a common retailer to distribute its goods. A common retailer is 
one who carries the products of several competing manufacturers 
and is not a franchise outlet for one manufacturer alone. The use of 
common retailers by manufacturers comprises a substantial portion 
of consumer marketing, from supermarkets and department stores 
to specialty shops carrying many brands of particular types of 
goods. The antitrust implications of such noncartel market struc-
tures are consequential. To better understand them in light of Sharp 
and ARCO, however, first requires a consideration of Sharp and 
ARCO's economic impact on the regulation of cartel activity. 
A. Cartelization: The Traditional Vertical Price Restraint Concern 
1. The Nature cif the Threat 
When manufacturers engage in horizontal price-fixing, they col-
lectively agree to raise prices above the competitive levels by reduc-
ing the amount of output sold,258 a consequence economists 
258. The impact of horizontal price-fixing can be seen readily through the following 
graph: 
Price 
s 
D 
o 
. Quantity 
FIGURE I 
D, the demand curve, represents various combinations of price and quantity that con-
sumers are willing to purchase. It indicates the higher the price of each good, the lower 
the quantity consumers are willing to purchase and vice versa. S, the supply curve, 
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consider anticompetitive. Antitrust laws also view horizontal price-
fixing as anticompetitive and treat them as per se illegal.259 The 
incentive for firms to engage in horizontal price-fixing arises when 
the agreement can increase prices sufficiently to offset more than 
the drop in revenue due to lower sales, so that overall profit levels 
• 260 --nse. 
Horizontal price agreemerits, however, also create a strong incen-
tive for each manufacturer to cheat. By reducing its price slightly 
below the agreement price, one manufacturer can expand its sales 
and market share dramatically, increasing its profits even further, 
but it does so only at the expense of the lost sales of those who 
continue to maintain the higher prices.261 The cheating firm, of 
course, must act in secreCy, othenvise the other firms will follow suit 
to avoid losing customers. Eventually, however,- all firms ,viII be 
forced to lower prices to keep their customers, and prices will fall 
back to the original competitive levels. Therefore, in order for 
price-fixing agreements to be successful, monitoring each manufac-
turer's price to detect cheaters is of paramount importance. 
Complications arise, however, when pricing is set at the retail 
level, but the agreement is made at the manufacturer level. The 
manufacturers may agree not to compete with respect to price, but if 
retailers are permitted to pursue intrabrand price competition, the 
variations in the retail price of the manufacturers' products makes it 
difficult for producers to assure adherence to the agreement.262 
shows the sum total of the quantities of goods each producer is willing to supply at each 
price if he or she is acting independently. Under competition, the markerforces drive 
the eqUilibrium price and quantity to C, where at price P" the quantity demanded by 
consumers and the quantity willingly supplied by producers when operating indepen-
dently, are equal. Ifproducers enter an agreement to collectively restrict supply to Qr. 
they could raise the market price each unit of the good would sell for to PI' These were 
the admitted circumstances in many of the early price-fixing cases, such as United States 
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
259. See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218. 
260. Clearly, the firms would have no incentive to engage in horizontal agreements to 
raise prices, given the necessity of restricting output to do so, unless each firm's profits 
after the agreement were greater than before the agreement. These increased profits 
would be ensured if the resulting percentage increase in price would be greater than the 
percentage decrease in quantity (in other words, if the demand curve of the industry is 
inelastic). Looking at the graph supra note 258, this would mean that the area of rectan-
gle l}H(b which would represent the industry total revenue, would exceed the area of 
rectangle P,CQ,O, the total reyenue before the price agreement. 
261. If one firm lowers its price slightly below all the other firms, customers presuma-
bly will shift their purchases to the lower priced firm. -
262. It is unclear what would constitute a price agreement in this case. A definition is 
hard to ascertain ~t the manufacturer level. Cartelizing manufacturers may want to con-
tinue nonprice competition (to woo customers given the restrained level of output), and 
if a manufacturer reduces its wholesale price so that the retailer can afford the nonprice 
activity, a cartel may not want such activities to count as price competition for purpose of 
agreement. 
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Controlling and monitoring retail prices is the most effective means 
that producers have of detecting those who deviate from the agree-
ment. Prohibiting retail price competition makes it easier for manu-
facturers to ascertain whether the price agreement is being violated. 
These arguments favor condemnation of vertical price restraints be-
cause the restraints are viewed as facilitating horizontal price-fixing 
at the manufacturer level. 
Just as vertical price restraints imposed by the manufacturer on 
dealers can facilitate cartelization among manufacturers, they also 
can facilitate cartelization among dealers. The dealers can deter-
mine a price level that will maximize joint profits among dealers 
(which would be above the competitive price) and then demand that 
the manufacturer impose that price on all dealers. Imposition of 
vertical price restraints by the manufacturer in this instance would 
serve two purposes. First, vertical price restraints would enable 
dealers to detect price cheaters just as they so enabled manufactur-
ers. Second, vertical price restraints provide an effective enforce-
ment mechanism (one not available to manufacturer cartels)263 
because manufacturers can terminate violating dealers, leaving the 
remaining dealers to operate under their agreement. Thus, con-
demnation of vertical price restraints serves not only to deter hori-
zontal price-fixing among manufacturers, but also to deter that 
practice among dealers as well. 
2. The Threat oj Cartelization After Sharp 
Justice Scalia, despite his leanings towards Chicago School analy-
sis (which considers the cartelization threat insignificant),264 ac-
knowledged in Sharp that the possibilities of cartelization might 
warrant maintaining a per se illegal rule for vertical price re-
straints.265 But in justifying the Court's narrowing of the scope of 
per se illegality, he also argued that such cartelization was unlikely 
to occur unless there was an agreement as to specific price levels. In 
Justice Scalia's view, "[c]artels are neither easy to form nor easy to 
maintain. Uncertainty over the terms of the cartel, particularly the 
263. For cartelizing manufacturers, when faced with a noncomplying member, often 
the cartel's only resort is to abandon the agreement altogether and allow prices to fall to 
their natural competitive levels. Because the incentive to cheat is so strong, it is usually 
the basis of the economic arguments that cartels cannot survive in the long run and 
therefore do not justify preventing per se legal rules. How long it takes, however, for 
the long run to take effect is uncertain. For example, the OPEC oil cartel lasted over ten 
years while economists, from the moment of OPEC's inception, were continuously pre-
dicting its imminent collapse. See, e.g., D.K. Osborne, AM. ECON. REV. 835,836 (1976) 
("(W]hen the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) formed their car-
tel in October 1973, many economists (myself included) predicted that it would collapse 
within a year. It is now thirty-six months later, and the cartel seems pretty healthy."). In 
fact, OPEC wreaked considerable world-wide economic havoc before market forces 
caused it to unravel. 
264. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 293 (stating that "[t]lte proposed legality of vert i-
cal restraints need not be questioned on the theory that it would enable successful and 
undetectable horizontal reseller cartels"). 
265. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988). 
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prices to be charged in the future, obstructs both formation and ad-
herence by making cheating easier."266 
Effective dealer cartelization, however, easily can occur even if the 
dealers do not agree to a specific price level with the manufacturer; 
the dealers merely can demand the termination of a discounter, as 
Hartwell did in Sharp.267 Repetition of this behavior ultimately will 
make clear the price levels the dealers want to maintain, without any 
explicit mention of price.26B Because agreements as to price are 
missing, under Sharp, such activities would not be considered verti-
cal price restraints. But they also would escape rule of reason analy-
sis because no nonprice activity is involved.269 Guided just by 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service CO.,270 a court would correctly judge 
the above-described activity as per se illegal because of the absence 
of independent activity by the manufacturer.271 But with the addi-
tional requirement of finding agreements as to specific price levels 
mandated by Sharp, the activity would fall into the de facto category 
of per se legality that the opinion creates.272 Yet there is no ques-
tion. that this activity is anticompetitive. 
3. The Case Jor Rule oj Reason 
One possible counterargument to criticisms of Sharp may be that 
even if vertical price restraints are made legal, thereby facilitating 
manufacturers' and dealers' horizontal price-fixing, if the #irms en-
gage in such activity they still will come under antitrust scrutiny for 
their horizontal price restraints-an issue that the Sharp opinion 
does not address.273 The difficulty is that horizontal price-fixing 
agreements are not always readily detectable. Even though the stan-
dards for establishing agreements are less stringent in the horizon-
tal cases, cartelizing firms typically will not leave smoking guns or 
paper trails, making detection difficult.274 Thus, because vertical 
price arrangements can serve as a springboard to horizontal ones, a 
possibility even Justice Scalia acknowledges,275 and given the diffi-
culties of discovering horizontal restraints, keeping vertical re-
straints subject to review by the courts is certainly a reasonable 
safeguard. 
266. Id. at 727. 
267. Id. at 721. 
268. Justice Scalia rctiected this assertion. See id. at 731. 
269. See supra text accompaning notes 213-25. 
270. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
271. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76. 
272. See supra text accompanying notes 213-25. 
273. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 534; Piraino, supra note 75. at 336 n.116. 
274. See Saul Levmore. Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restraints and 
Consumer bifonnation, 67 IOWA L. REV. 981. 993 (1982). 
275. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp .• 485 U.S. 717. 725·26 (l988). 
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On the other hand, given that vertical arrangements often have 
not only price impacts but legitimate competitive purposes as well, 
such as guarding against free riders276 and blocking retail 
supra competitive pricing,277 per se illegal treatment seems too 
strong. A rule of reason approach in which courts can assess the 
conduct's market effect on a case-by-case basis is best suited to max-
imize the legalization of efficient restraints while minimizing errone-
ous judicial rulings as to the competitive nature of the litigated 
corporate behavior. 
A useful standard in this context could be to determine whether 
an economic justification for the vertical price restraints exists, such 
as protecting against free riders, which can be evidence of in-
dependent action by manufacturers as permitted by Monsanto. 278 If 
no such justification can be shown, however, the court should then 
declare the restraint to be a violation of antitrust law. Such a stan-
dard would be in accord with the reasoning in Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 279 in which the Court stated, in the con-
text of a monopolization claim, that if no economic efficiency justifi-
cations could be provided, and a potential anticompetitive effect 
loomed large, the restraint would be invalidated.280 
B. New Developments in Economic Theory: Industry Monopoly Pricing 
Without Cartelization 
Given that horizontal cartelization does come under antitrust 
scrutiny, the question still remains whether the legalization of verti-
cal price restraints will lead to noncompetitive pricing when carte-
lization is not present, with or without agreements as to specific 
price levels. Recent developments in economic theory demonstrate 
in an economically rigorous manner that when manufacturers 
choose to use retailers to distribute their goods, there are circum-
stances that lead to industry monopoly pricing without a horizontal 
agreement, express or implied, on either the manufacturer or dealer 
leveL281 
1. When Per Se Legality Prevents Procompetitive Conduct 
An important phenomenon occurs when a manufacturer's profit 
maximizing strategy is to sell its goods to a common retailer, such as 
a supermarket, which carries the products of competing manufactur-
ers. When a common retailer is the manufacturer's optimal choice, 
the manufacturer's profits are enhanced because the retailer acts as 
276. See supra notes 159·66 and accompanying text. But see infra text accompanying 
notes 311-31. 
277. See infra text accompanying notes 295-309. 
278. Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 758-59 (1984); see supra 
notes 172-76 & 181-82 and accompanying text. 
279. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
280. !d. at 605. 
281. See supra note 254. 
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a buffer between different manufacturers, mitigating price competi-
tion among them.282 The retailer has no incentive to pit one manu-
facturer's goods against another's by lowering each product's price 
because that merely reduces the revenue to the retailer. It can be 
shown that the retailer, in maximizing his own profits, indepen-
dently will cheose to maintain all. retail prices at. a level that also 
maximizes the joint profits of all the manufacturers, which is the 
equivalent. to the industry monopoly or collusive price. On the 
other hand, if manufacturers market their goods independently or 
through exclusive franchises, they may be forced, through price 
competition at the retail level, to reduce their prices to competitive 
levels, and thus decrease theirprofits.283 Therefore, when manufac-
turers engage in appropriate strategic behavior, retailers may 
choose cartel prices without any cartels occurring. 
Understanding the individual common retailer's incentive to price 
at the monopoly level enables one to extrapolate what the market 
dynamics are when a marketplace consists of many of these common 
retailers, for example, when there are several supermarkets in the 
community. Strong incentives exist for one retailer to reduce its 
price slightly to expand its market share significantly at the expense 
of the others,just as when there is a carte1.284 The retailer's incen-
tive is a classic example of intrabrand price competition spurring 
price discounting. If left unfettered, the ultimate result will be that 
market prices will fall t~ competitive levels.285 If, however, manu-
facturers are permitted to engage in vertical price-fixing, because, 
282. Although the use of common retailers is assumed in some articles. see, e.g., Shaf-
fer. supra note 254. a recent article by Professors Thomas). Hoerger and Andrew W. 
Horowitz. see supra note 254. is the first to demonstrate rigorou!i!y when it is optimal to 
use common retailers. Professors Hoerger and Horowitz snow that the manufacturer's 
optimal marketing strategy depends on how close substitute competing brands are -to 
each other, and to what extent the manufacturer can share in the retailer's supranormal 
profits. The greater the substitutability or the percentage of profit share, or both, the 
more likely it is optimal for the manufacturer to prefer the common retailer. Id. at 6-20. 
Although profit-sharing between manufacturer and retailer often may not be observed 
formally, the constant communication between manufacturer and retailer as to "how 
business is doing." as is described in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984), affords the manufacturer the opportunity to acljust regularly its 
wholesale prices to capture, in effect, a share of the profits. A different model, see 
Hoerger & Horowitz, supra note 254, shows that the common retailer is preferred over a 
franchise or direct competition between manufacturers because the common retailer en-
ables the manufacturers to achieve the collusive (or monopoly) price. See Bernheim & 
Whinston. supra note 254. 
283. See Hoerger & Hormvitz, supra note 254. 
284. See supra notes 260·62 and accompanying text. 
285. Prior to the price discounting, the manufacturer and all the common retailers 
are sharing supranormal profits because price is at the industry monopoly price. Any 
one of the retailers. however. has an incentive to start discounting the retail price 
slightly so that its sales of goods that generate additional supranormal profits wiII in-
crease. The other retailers wiII be unhappy because they wiIllose customers. The man-
ufacturer will be unhappy because even though his profits from the price-discounter will 
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say, of per se legal antitrust treatment, then the intrabrand price 
competition will be impeded and retailers will maintain their mo-
nopoly pricing. Furthermore, neither the manufacturers nor the re-
tailers will be subject to antitrust scrutiny because no horizontal 
agreements underlie the conduct. Therefore, legalizing vertical 
price restraints actually becomes the primary means for creating and 
maintaining industry-wide monopoly pricing in widely prevalent 
contexts and does so by subverting the natural and, in these circum-
stances, important forces of intrabrand competition. . 
Reliance on interbrand competition to resolve these excessive 
price levels (as the Continental T. v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 286 and 
Sharp opinions do to justify permitting vertical nonprice re-
straints)287 is to no avail here because, when manufacturers elect to 
use common retailers, no interbrand competition exists. Per se le-
gality for vertical price restraints, moreover, makes the use of a com-
mon retailer even more attractive to the manufacturer, because it 
assures that the manufacturer will be able to derive the benefits of 
industry monopoly pricing. In these circumstances, therefore, un-
constrained vertical price restraints actually would decrease inter-
brand and intrabrand competition as well as consumer welfare. 
Clearly, the antitrust implications of the common retailer market 
structure contrast considerably with the traditional view that vertical 
price restraints enhance interbrand competition.288 Given the wide-
spread use of common retailers, such antitrust implications cannot 
be ignored. 
Because vertical price restraints can foster monopoly pricing for a 
considerably broader range of markets than previously thought, cre-
ating per se legality for vertical price fixing is tantamount to open-
ing the door to those dangers. It is difficult to believe that 
manufacturers and retailers will not engage in such supracompeti-
tive pricing activities if they will enhance profits. Early antitrust his-
tory shows that firms lack no inhibitions to engage in monopoly 
increase, that increase will be more than offset by the reduction in profits received from 
the other retailers due to their lost sales. The net loss occurs because as prices fall, any 
price below the monopoly price represents lower total profits to be shared. By defini-
tion, the monopoly price is the one that maximizes profits. The insight of the economic 
analyses cited supra note 282 is the demonstration that through strategic wholesale pric-
ing schemes, the manufacturer can induce the common retailer to elect on his own to 
charge the monopoly price. But once again, these economic analyses do not place the 
common retailer in a marketplace with many common retailers, as this Article does. 
Once one retailer starts to discount, unless some restriction is in place that allows the 
manufacturer and other retailers to stop the discounter (such as per se legality for verti-
cal price restraints), the natural course will be that the other retailers will have to lower 
their prices to compete effectively with the price-discounter. The end result is that all 
retailers reduce prices to competitive levels and the supranormal profits no longer ac-
crue to any of the parties. This analysis explains why one commonly observes lower 
prices in larger urban areas where many common retailers exist and higher prices (or at 
least prices closer to the "suggested retail prices") in smaller town environments where 
very few, if more than one, common retailers exist. 
286. 433 U.S. 36 {I977}. 
287. Business Elecs. Corp. \'. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717. 725 (1988); S.l'/t'allia. 
433 U.S. at 52 n.19. 
288. Set'slIpra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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pricing.289 Antitrust law effectively has suppressed the more overt 
manifestations of horizontal cartelization activities, which explains 
why there is not a greater incidence of that conduct being con-
demned today. If, however, antitrust scrutiny of vertical price re-
straints is eliminated altogether--and Sharp may have indeed set the 
groundwork29°-one can expect an upsurge in industry-wide mo-
nopoly pricing, the antithesis of pro competitive and economically 
efficient business behavior. Finally, the conduct will escape any 
other antitrust review because horizontal restraints also are not 
involved. 
Given the anticompetitive threat that vertical price restraints 
might pose, creating per se legality for them seems unwarranted. 
Because vertical price restraints may encourage supracompetitive 
pricing policies at the manufacturer and retailer levels, something 
that is neither remote nor insubstantial, the door should remain 
open for judicial revieW' of possible anticompetitive conduct. Con-
cededly, such a revieW' requires a larger expenditure of judicial re-
sources than required with per se legality.291 Yet. the courts long 
have warned that serious harm could result from cursory antitrust 
judgments,292 suggesting that the conservation of judicial resources 
through extensive applications of per se rules can be inappropriate. 
Furthermore. the sophistication that economic theory recently has 
developed in recognizing various market structures and corporate 
strategic behavior. can render a rule of reason approach far more 
efficient in its analysis. as well as more subtle.293 
Just as per se illegal rules should be reserved only for conduct 
that is always or nearly always anticompetitive. per se legal categori-
zation should apply only when the conduct is inherently procompet-
itive. Because it is now evident that vertical price restraints have a 
strong anticompetitive potential, as ,"veIl as a procompetitive effect, 
rule of reason scrutiny, which alloW's consideration of both possibili-
ties. is the correct judicial approach. 
289. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); lJnited States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
290. See supra text accompanying notes 222-25. 
291. This has been one of the most frequently given reasons for maintaining a per se 
rule, whether the proponent is advocating per se legality or per se illegality. See, e.g., 
BORK, supra note 4, at 288; William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fi:ang, l'ertical Alarkct Re-
strictions, a1ld the New Antitrust POll,)" 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1001 (1985) (advocating the 
per se illegal rule in the interest of '1udicial economy" even if some pro competitive 
behavior becomes prohibited). 
292. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (stating 
that "summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation 
where motive and intent play leading roles"). Even Justice Scalia in Sharp announced 
• that the rule of reason analysis should be the norm. Business Elees. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,726 (1988). 
293. See i1lfra notes 332-49 and accompanying text. 
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2. When Per Se Illegality Promotes Anticompetitive Behavior 
Just as the Chicago School's penchant for per se legality creates 
barriers against significant pro competitive business behavior, the 
Modern Populist School's penchant for per se illegality fosters mar-
ket dynamics that reduce consumer welfare. The phenomenon of 
manufacturers setting maximum prices above which retailers cannot 
charge provides a good vehicle for examining the danger of blanket 
per se rules against all forms of vertical price restraints, a position 
the Modern Populist School seeks to maintain.294 
Intuitively, one might conclude that there are no ill effects from 
maximum price limits because it means that manufacturers are set-
ting lower prices and probably selling more output than otherwise, 
an effect that is in consumers' interest. Nonetheless, the Modern 
Populist School argues that maximum price-setting should be pro-
hibited because it constitutes price-fixing that might, in turn, lead to 
manufacturers setting minimum prices, an activity known as resale 
price maintenance. Resale price maintenance, the Modem Populists 
assert, will result in prices above competitive levels.295 Further-
more, even though lower. prices sometimes may occur, the permis-
sion to set prices is so fraught with the danger of resale price 
maintenance that its prevention would require policing entire indus-
tries, a drain on society's resources.296 The most efficacious and ex-
pedient course, the Modem Populist School concludes, is treat all of 
vertical price-fixing as per se illega1.297 
The Modem Populist School's assumption that maximum price-
setting's potential for minimum price-setting is pervasive and costly 
to contain if not prohibited outright, is not necessarily correct, 
although it has powerful intuitive appeal. Moreover, in certain mar-
ket structures involving common retailers, discussed below, the set-
ting of maximum prices is the only means of lowering prices to 
competitive levels for consumers.298 In fact, in those market con-
texts, the price-fixing conduct is amenable to quick and efficient rule 
of reason evaluation when proper guidelines and standards are in 
294. See supra note 67 and text accompanying notes 258·63. Professor Robert Pitof-
sky suggests, however, that price maximums should be judged under the rule of reason. 
Pitofsky, supra note 67, at 1490 n.17. 
295. See, e.g., JohnJ. Flynn &:James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and thejurisprudenceoJ 
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations oj Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution oj Antitrust 
Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1149 (1987) (arguing that "[iJn cases where maximum 
price fixing takes place, be it horizontal or vertical, the markets involved are usually 
characterized by a virtually complete departure from the ideal of a perfecdy competitive 
market") (footnotes omitted); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 
U.S. 332, 342-45 (1982); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968). 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 258-63. The Modem Populist School, of 
course, did not anticipate the problems generated by resale price maintenance brought 
on by manufacturers' use of common dealers. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying 
text. They could, however, add that scenario to their arguments as well. 
297. See, e.g., Maricopa COUllty, 457 U.S. at 342-43; Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53; Kiefer- • 
Stewart Co. v.Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). 
298. See il/fra notes 302-08 and accompanying text. 
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force, adequately safeguarding against the emergence of anticompe-
titive resale price maintenance.299 On the other hand, if the Modern 
Populist method of preventing the potential for minimum price-fix-
ing through per se illegality of any price-fixing continues to prevail, 
then the economic consequences will be supranormal prices in 
those markets for which maximum-price setting is the only means to 
prevent high prices from occurring. 
The common retailer market structure in which a manufacturer 
'will wish to impose ceilings so that prices will be reduc~"d30o ?ccurs 
, . 
299. See infra text accompanying notes 306-10. 
300. The manufacturer's optimal sales and retail price level can be determined by the 
following graphical analysis. 
Price 
MCM 
PMM -----
D 
MR 
o Quantity 
FIGURE II 
D represents the demand curve for goods; MR represents the marginal revenue each 
additional sale will bring into the firm, acknowledging that in order to sell the additional 
unit, the sales price has to falL MCM represents the manufacturer's marginal cost of 
producing each unit. The manufacturer maximizes his or her profits by selling enough 
units so that the marginal cost of the last unit sold equals its marginal revenue, which is 
represented on the graph as point H, with associated output level, QMM. The optimal 
retail price for the manufacturer is PMM. If the retailer wishes to charge above this 
price, which can happen, see infra note 303, the manufacturer will wish to impose price-
ceilings on its retailer. 
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when the retailer's optimal retail price is higher than the optimal 
one for the manufacturer.SOl If the retailer charges its higher price, 
301. Just as with the manufacturer, the retailer maximizes profits by selling at the 
level of output in which the marginal cost to the retailer of the last unit sold equals the 
marginal revenue. The retailer, however, has two components to its costs. One is its 
own marginal cost curve from "running the store." The other is the wholesale price that 
the manufacturer charges the retailer for each unit. The graph below shows what the 
wholesale price would have to be to induce the retailer to charge and sell the manufac-
turer's desired retail price and quantity. 
Price 
MCR+WP 
D 
WP 
MR 
o Quantity 
FIGURE III 
D is the demand curve and MR is the marginal revenue curve as before. WP is the 
wholesale price the manufacturer charges the retailer. MCR + WP represents the sum of 
the retailer's own marginal cost of "running the store," /'vICR, and the wholesale price. 
Notice that in this graph, the manufacturer has chosen a wholesale price such that when 
it is added to the MCR, the retailer's optimal quantity and price are exactly as desired by 
the manufacturer from figure two. See supra note 300. In other words, the retailer 
charges PMM and sells QMM. 
The manufacturer, however, is losing money at this wholesale price because it is 
clearly less than the manufacturer's own marginal cost. See supra note 300. In this case, 
the manufacturer can earn profits only ifit can extract the retailer's supranormal profits, 
which some economists suggest can be done by charging a licensing fee. See, e.g., 
Bonanno & Vickers, supra note 254; Rey & Stiglitz, supra note 254. Professor Greg Shaf-
fer points out, however, that the licensing possibility is only an assumption that the au-
thors of the earlier works make and may not be available in all circumstances. Shaffer, 
supra note 254, at 21. Furthermore, Professor Shaffer points out that licensing may not 
be a possibility when the manufacturer is competing with other manufacturers for "shelf 
space" at a common retailer. !d. The retailer can pit the manufacturers against each 
other to get them to reduce their licensing fees, perhaps even to zero. 
The alternative, then, is for the manufacturer to consider what the optimal wholesale 
price should be given that the retailer will choose a different retail price (and therefore 
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sales to the manufacturer will decline, causing the manufacturer to 
lose profits.302 If the manufacturer sets a maximum retail price, it 
changes the retailer's profit-maximizing decisions, and, as a result, 
the retailer 'will elect to sell more goods, and at a lower price.303 
Although the manufacturer always will seek to set lower prices in 
such situations, it will not be able to do so if vertical price restraints 
are per se illegal. 
There also are circumstances in which, even if vertical price fixing 
were not per se illegal, the manufacturer's imposition of a price 
maximum still would not be sufficient to achieve lower prices. If 
many manufacturers are competing with other brands, a retailer can 
threaten to refuse to carry the goods of a manufacturer who is alone 
sell a different quantity) than what the manufacturer otherwise would like. The manu-
facturer has to find a wholesale price that will maximize its profits, given the retailer's 
response. Figure IV shows that as the manufacturer increases its wholesale price, so will 
the retailer increase the retail price, thereby reducing the quantity of the good sold. 
Price 
:MCR+WP* 
wp* D 
WIR 
o Quantity 
FIGURE IV 
302. See supra note 302. 
303. Ideally, the manufacturer can overcome the retailer's incentive to charge high 
prices by setting price-maximums, as in Albrec,ht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
The manufacturer can set a price ceiling at PMM, and charge a wholesale price suffi-
ciently below that so that the retailer can earn a normal profit rather than the supra-
normal profits it would earn in the previous cases. 
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in setting a price maximum. Then, in order for a price maximum to 
be effective, all the manufacturers need to enter into an agreement 
to enforce it.304 To permit such agreements to be made would re-
quire the courts to adopt a rule of reason approach to horizontal 
price-maximum agreements as well as to vertical price restraints. 
Under current antitrust law, the general per se prohibition against 
horizontal price agreements would not allow such price-reducing 
conduct.305 Because the courts have chosen, however, not to cate-
gorize other horizontal price agreements as per se illegal because of 
their procompetitive effects,306 there seems to be no reason for 
them not to fashion similar antitrust accommodations for those 
common retailer market structures that warrant it. 
The common retailer market structure provides built-in safe-
guards against the abuse of more flexible antitrust treatments. If 
economic circumstances change so that the manufacturer's incentive 
becomes to seek to set minimum prices to facilitate cartelization, im-
plicitly the stage is set for some retailer to become a price-dis-
counter.307 Once price discounting begins, the manufacturer either 
will abandon the minimum prices or terminate the dealer. If the 
Price 
D 
MR 
o Quantity 
FIGURE V 
304. Professor Shaffer also suggests that some relaxation of antitrust laws might be 
appropriate in this case. See Shaffer, supra note 254. 
305. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 327 (1982). 
306. See, e.g., BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
307. See supra notes 260·61 & 286. 
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latter occurs, the tenninated discounter will sue, alleging vertical 
price-fixing. As long as vertical price-fixing is in the rule of reason 
category (and the Sharp standard does not apply), the courts will be 
able to find the tennination of the price-discounter anticompetitive 
and therefore illegal. Thus, a properly guided rule of reason analy-
sis allows those price-fixing situations that the Modem Populist 
School wants to prevent to be declared illegal, while it validates 
those price-fixing agreements that foster efficiency, the primary con-
cern of the Chicago Schoo1.BOS With appropriate rule of reason cri-
teria, the wrongfully tenninated dealer will have nearly as much 
protection in the court~ as with a per se illegal rule for vertical price 
restraints, but without the attendant social costs of impeding other 
corporate behavior that is procompetitive. Given these possibilities, 
per se illegal treatment of all vertical price restraints seems unneces-
sary and detrimental to consumer welfare. 
C. Protecting Against Free Riders 
Another argument justifying per se legality for vertical restraints, 
the concern about free riders, also assumes that all efforts by manu-
facturers to engage in interbrand competition are necessarily the 
most efficient and in the best interest of consumers.B09 Because 
manufacturers often seek to implement interbrand strategies at the 
retailer level, they often want to force retailers to follow their poli-
cies. Vertical restraints are viewed by many courts and scholars as 
the most effective means for accomplishing this purpose.BIO In par-
ticular, vertical price restraints are considered an important mecha-
nism to prevent some retailers from free riding at the expense of 
those retailers adhering to the manufacturers' strategies.Bll It is not 
clear, however, that vertical price restraints are in fact the most ef-
fective means of guarding against every instance of free riding. 
Even in those cases where vertical price restraints appear to be the 
only recourse to stopping free riding, it is still questionable whether 
it is in the consumers' best interest to allow the manufacturer to do 
so. 
308. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 61-64. 
310. See supra notes 61-64. 
311. See supra notes 61-64. For a general discussion of free riding. see supra text ac-
companying note 62. 
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1. When Vertical Price Restraints Are Not the Best Means for 
Preventing Free Riding 
a. Post-Sales Services 
By imposing vertical price restraints, the manufacturer forces re-
tailers to compete with each other through nonprice methods, such 
as providing better customer services, particularly those services 
that the manufacturer deems effective in attracting customers in the 
interbrand market.Sl2 For example, if the manufacturer finds that 
providing post-sales services (such as repairs and maintenance) will 
make its product more appealing to consumers, it can require the 
retailer to provide them. The question is how the manufacturer can 
assure that the retailer will make every effort to make those services 
available. 
If the manufacturer elects to sell the goods and the post-sales 
services as one package with one price, a number of problems can 
arise. A discounting retailer may choose to provide shoddy and 
therefore cheaper post-sales services to facilitate its ability to charge 
lower prices. This leaves the manufacturer with two options. One is 
to allow the consumer access to any retailer for post-sales services 
regardless of where the product was purchased. The problem with 
this option is that not all consumers will discover which retailer pro-
vides good services, and even when consumers do. that retailer 'will 
not receive compensation for the quality service it does provide be-
cause it did not make the initial sale. The result will be an increased 
proportion of consumers purchasing the goods from the price dis-
counter and servicing the goods at the full service stores. Because 
the profitability to the retailer of providing quality service will be 
diminished, so will the availability of the quality service, which 
defeats the manufacturer's initial purpose. 
The manufacturer's second option is to require the consumer to 
take any necessary post-sales service from the store where the origi-
nal purchase was made, thus forcing the consumer to absorb the 
costs as well as the benefits of the discount price. The problem is 
that the manufacturer will not achieve as much reputation enhance-
ment from providing quality post-sales service that it seeks to in-
crease its sales. 
Vertical price restraints, it is argued, provide the manufacturer 
with a third alternative, one that can safeguard against either of the 
other two undesirable outcomes.SIS If the manufacturer may en-
gage in resale price maintenance, the price discounter will be unable 
to reduce its prices and consumers will have no incentive to 
purchase from a particular dealer because of its price. If, in con-
junction with resale price maintenance, the manufacturer requires 
that customer service be available only from the store where the 
good was bought, then it behooves the consumer to select the store 
312. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 28, at 6-7; Posner, supra note 25. at 6; Sullivan, supra 
note 43. at 786. 
313. See supra note 28. 
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providing the best service because price is no longer an issue. 
Given the customer's efforts to maximize the benefits received from 
the dollars spent, competition among retailers drives each to pro-
vide the best post-sales service possible so as to increase sales. 
Therefore, not only will the stores be compensated for these serv-
ices, but the quality of their service will enhance sales overall as well. 
The resulting increase in sales and service quality is dearly in the 
consumers' interest, a value that the Chicago School argues should 
be antitrust law's primary goal.314 
The question is whether vertical price restraints are the only or 
the most effectual means for accomplishing these ends. If the man-
ufacturer elects instead to "unbundle" its goods,SI5 that is, sell the 
good separately from the service, consumer welfare, as shall be 
seen, can be enhanced even further than when vertical price re-
straints are employed. The unbundling approach also will not ex-
pose society to the potential anticompetitive threats that vertical 
price restraints do. 
If the manufacturer unbundles the goods from the service and 
permits the consumer to select the retailer of choice, both at the 
time of sale and at the time of service, retailers can compete with 
regard to both the price of the good and the price and quality of 
service. The consumer thus will gain the benefit of lower prices 
from intrabrand competition and still have access to quality post-
sales services. In addition, the consumer.is not forced to pay for the 
post-sales services imposed by vertical price restraints, services that 
some consumers may not want or want to pay for.SI6 Finally, as is 
often the case when there is a trade off between price and service, a 
range of differen~ combinations of the two may be offered in the 
marketplace; some stores will sell the best service for the highest 
price while others will provide the minimal service for the lowest 
price, with other stores making available various combinations of 
price and service in between.317 A range of price-quality combina-
tions in the marketplace enhances consumer welfare because con-
sumers are able to tailor their consumption of services more closely 
to their tastes and income needs. And, in fact, providing a low-cost, 
no-service option to the consumer is one function a free rider 
314. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 32; Kelly, supra note 40, at 366; Posner, 
supra note 28, at 21. 
315. "Bundling" and "unbundling" goods and their impact on consumer welfare is a 
subject frequently addressed by economists over the years. See, e.g., Shenvin Rosen, 
Hedollic Prices alld Implicit Markets: Product Di/fere1ltiatioll ill Pure Competitio1l, 82 J. POL. 
ECON. 34 (1974). 
316. For example, the consumer may be quite handy with the product and enjoy 
working on it as a hobby. 
317. Dry cleaning establishments are a good example, offering a range of price.qual-
ity combinations to the public. 
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serves.3IS 
h. Advertising 
Vertical price restraints also can safeguard against the free rider's 
impact on local advertising. If the discounter refuses to participate 
in collective advertising by other local retailers, it can free ride in 
two ways. The most obvious is that without paying for it, the free 
rider nevertheless will benefit from the advertising through in-
creased inquiries and sales arising from the stimulated demand. Be-
cause each retailer only will contribute in advertising dollars to the 
extent that its revenues are increased, if the free rider does not con-
tribute its economic share, the level of collective advertising will be 
suboptimal, hurting the manufacturer and all the retailers except 
the free rider who receives his benefits from advertising for free.319 
The second way the free rider exploits the other retailers by not 
participating in advertising costs is through its resultant ability to 
discount prices. The free rider actually can draw many of the new 
customers away from those dealers who did pay for the advertising, 
if the customers, in addition to responding to the advertisements, 
engage in price comparison shopping. Every new customer created 
by the advertisement who also calls the price discounter to compare 
price ultimately will buy from the discounter, because its prices will 
be lower. The impact is to further diminish other retailers' incentive 
to engage in advertising, which can be detrimental to the manufac-
turer's overall market share.32o 
Although vertical price restraints would resolve this second prob-
lem, an even better solution would solve both without the vertical 
price restraints' anticompetitive risk. The manufacturer can pay for 
the local advertising and charge all the retailers, including the dis-
counter, a fee for the service by including it in the wholesale price of 
the goods. The discounter would then have no artificial competitive 
318. Contra, e.g., Kelly, supra note 40, at 366 ("Typically, both the product and the 
dealer services associated with it are sold as a package. The fact that bundling meets the 
market test indicates that it is efficient to do so. To require firms to unbundle such 
packages at the expense of the consumer is contrary to the intent of the antitrust laws."). 
319. Professors (now judges) Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook made a 
similar point. Professors Posner and Easterbrook noted that in the case of a group of 
small manufacturers sharing a common trademark, some manufacturers might be 
tempted not to commit their own resources for advertising in the hope of taking a free 
ride. See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANrrrRUST 248-49 (2d ed. 
1980). Professors Posner and Easterbrook noted that if manufacturer B chooses not to 
advertise while manufacturer A does advertise, manufacturer "A's expenditures have 
created a market which B can exploit at no cost to him; B reaps what A has sown." Jd. at 
249; see also jonathan M. jacobson, On Termi1lating Pn'ce-Cutting Distributors in Response to 
Competitors' Complaints, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 677, 682-83 (1983) (noting that argument 
made in favor of resale price maintenance as a way of combating against free riders is 
that "[t]he free rider[] ... will tend to attract customers who have already received the 
benefit of promotions ... provided by the higher-priced distributors"). 
320. See POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 323, at 248-49 (noting that free ride may 
be taken on competitors' advertisement expenditures because having "incurred no ad-
vertising expense," the free rider "can profitably undersell" his competitors);jacobson, 
supra note 323, at 682-83 (noting that according to proponents of rule of reason treat-
ment for vertical price-fixing "distributors not ... participating in promotions-'free 
riders'-will have lower costs and will be able to charge lower prices"). 
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advantage attributable to lower costs from free riding, and yet 
would be free to engage in any intrabrand price competition on a 
legitimate basis. The consumer would then gain the advantages 
both from the advertising information and from the lower prices. 
2. Point-of-Sales Services-Services Not Worth Protecting 
The strongest argument in favor of allowing resale price mainte-
nance to guard against free riding problems is the protection of 
point-of-sales services. Point-of-sales services usually consist of in-
vestments the retailer makes to induce customers to purchase their 
goods. The most typical example, and the one most frequently ar-
gued in the courts, is the provision of trained and experienced per-
sonnel capable of explaining the product line· and helping 
consumers assess their needs.321 This seFVice is considered valuable 
for the consumer, particularly when the consumer is dealing with 
products that are at the high end of technological innovation. Man-
ufacturers often view the provision of such services as crucial to en-
hancing their market share, and it is in this area that the free riding 
discounter plays its most irritating role. 
Many consumers make their initial inquiry into a product by going 
to a full service store with experienced personnel. There, a con-
sumer can learn about the available products and how they meet the 
consumer's needs. Often, after collecting sufficient information 
from expert salespeople at the full service store, the consumer 
makes a decision but then purchases the chosen products through a 
price-discounting retailer, a retailer who can charge lower prices be-
cause it provides no point-of-sales services, or because it has little 
retail overhead, such as a mail-order outIet.S22 Because the full-ser-
vice store pays the cost of the experienced professional sales force, 
it cannot compete in price. If the full service store fails to make the 
sales necessary to cover its personnel costs, its incentive to provide 
those services is diminished greatly. 
321. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), provides an 
excellent example. In that case, one of Monsanto's criteria for-renewing the contracts of 
its distributors was "whether the distributor employed trained salesmen capable of edu-
cating its customers on the technical aspects of Monsanto's herbicides." Id. at 756. 
Spray-Rite, the terminated dealer, had only one salesman on its payroll. Id.; see also Da-
vis-Watkins Co. v. Service MerchandiJie, 686 F.2d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir. 1982) (recogniz-
ing that manufacturers desire to eliminate free-riding by requiring certain services of its 
dealers, including, "trained salespersons on the floor to answer [consumer] questions"); 
Corrosion Resistant Materials Co. v. Steelite, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 407, 408-09 (D.NJ. 
1988) (granting summary judgment in favor ofa manufacturer that marketed his prod-
ucts through a dual distribution system, one for materials only and one that provided 
materials and services); Computer Connection, Inc. v. Apple Computer Corp., 621 F. 
Supp. 569, 570-71 (E.D. La. 1985) (granting summary judgment to a computer manu-
facturer that terminated a dealer for selling equipment without the use of specially 
trained sales personnel). 
322. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
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If the manufacturer considers these point-of-sales services a cru-
cial strategy for interbrand competition, vertical price restraints 
seem to be the only safeguard available. Not only will vertical price 
restraints preclude free rider price-discounting, but they also will 
serve to enhance the quality of point-of-sales services. Because in-
trabrand price competition is no longer an option, the retailers can 
compete only with regard to service quality.323 The question is 
whether enhanced point-of-sales services are in the consumers' best 
interest. The presumption is that they are because they provide in-
formation that the consumer values.324 
Assuming that point-of-sales services do provide useful informa-
tion, it already has been demonstrated that, for the most part, those 
consumers who benefit the most are those who purchased solely be-
cause of the information.325 In other words, the point-of-sales serv-
ices do not enhance significantly the well being of those consumers 
who would have purchased the goods regardless of the availability 
of information at the store. Because the information costs are in-
cluded in the product price, all the consumers, those who do not 
derive any benefit as well as those who do, will pay for the informa-
tion's availability. As a result, whether consumer welfare is en-
hanced overall is at best unclear.326 
Even the proposition that point-of-sales services benefits consum-
ers is itself highly questionable. A number of factors raise the suspi-
cion that the services really do not improve the customer's position. 
The goal of sales personnel clearly is not congruous with the goal of 
the customer. The salesperson wants to sell more product, not less, 
and by tapping into consumer ignorance he may induce customers 
to buy more than they need, or convince them that they are getting 
more than they actually are. Each retailer also carries a limited 
number of product lines and a limited number of products within 
each line. The salesperson has an incentive to convince the unwit-
ting consumer that the products the salesperson has available are 
exactly what the customer needs, when, in fact, another brand 
would serve the customer better. 
Finally, the marketplace already has provided far superior solu-
tions to product puffing and misinformation. In many product ar-
eas, consumer magazines have emerged that test and evaluate 
products on objective bases, and discuss different needs a consumer 
might have and how best to fill them. The most widely known is 
Consumer Reports, but there also are specialized publications, such as 
PC Magazine for personal computers, Runner's World for running 
323. See, e.g., William Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
933,946 (1987); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 13-14; Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 524. 
324. See, e.g., POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 323, at 213 (assuming, in discussing 
the problem of free riders, that "services are valued by consumers"). 
325. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text. 
326. See Comanor, supra note 29, at 991-92; Comanor & Kirkwood, supra note 249, at 
13. For a critique of the Comanor & Kirkwood article. see Lawrence J. White, Resale 
Price .\/aintenance and the Problem of MarginaL and Inframarginal elLStomers, 1985 CONTEMP. 
POL'y ISSUES 17. 
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shoes, Car and Driver for automobiles, and Stereo' Review for musical 
sound systems.327 Consulting firms also have emerged so that con-
sumers can pose their questions to an unbiased person rather than 
glean answers from an article. Furthermore, a plethora of manuals 
have appeared on the market that contain far greater and more ac-
curate information on the use of products than any particular sales 
person can possess. The increase in toll-free service by manufactur-
ers to support their products is an acknowledgement that, in fact, in-
store point-of-sales services is not working satisfactorily. 
Thus, the economic justification for protecting vertical price re-
straints so that they can guard against free riders seems shaky at 
bes~. Certainly, providing per se legality seems too risky. At the 
very least, such conduct should be open to judicial scrutiny, where 
rule of reason treatment seems eminently appropriate. 
VIL The Rule oj Reason-The Middle Road 
To achieve the economically efficient regulation of business activ-
ity suggested by the economic analyses in the previous section not 
only requires abandonment of per se rules, both legal and illegal, 
but also requires a sophisticated structuring of rule of reason analy-
sis. In other words. specific guidelines must be developed to permit 
a more refined evaluation of pro- and anticompetitive effects of par-
ticular business behavior. 
The conventional wisdom is that a rule of reason approach im-
plies that courts must be inundated with extensive empirical data 
analysis.328 In the past, such detailed examination of the specifics of 
particular corporate conduct has entailed that kind of investigation. 
The problem has been that empirical investigations often take 
years,S29 are highly inconclusive because of the nature of data analy-
sis itself, 3S0 and the conclusions reached are very sensitive to nu-
ances of approach.SSl Empirical studies, however, are not the only 
327. See Levmore, supra note 274, at 991 (characterizing such organizations as down-
stream informers). 
328. See, e.g., MCl Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir.) 
(requiring four months of trial to present and analyze empirical data), cerl. denied, 464 
U.S. 891 (1983). 
329. From first filing until the date of trial, all parties involved in the AT&T case 
spent six years engaging in empirical studies to support their positions. See ill. 
330. See, e.g., JAN !{MENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 247 (1971). 
331. For this reason, courts recently have tried to short circuit this route by increas-
ingly granting summary judgments in favor of defendants based on theoretical economic 
arguments. See Resale Price Maintenance Bill Would Help Tenninaled Dealer To Gel § J Case 10 
Jury·, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1460, at 483 (Apr. 5, 1990). This has 
not been a proper use of theoretical argumentation, however, because the courts have 
been resorting in these cases to Chicago School analyses that in effect assert that all 
corporate conduct is economically efficient. For a discussion of these Chicago School 
analyses, see supra note 28. 
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means to implement rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason can 
operate on a more theoretical plane, drawing on economic theory to 
discover the nature of the market dynamics in antitrust cases. 
A theoretical approach is less time consuming and can be more 
accurate, make more refined distinctions, and be more readily acces-
sible to the courts. Theoretical economic analysis seeks to uncover 
the core of market dynamics in any given situation while being in-
dependent of the particular numbers involved; it looks more to the 
fundamental structure and operating behavior of the parties and 
their interactions. 
The previous subsections evaluating the impact of vertical re-
straints all are examples of applications of theoretical economic 
analyses, an approach that the courts increasingly have been adopt-
ing in a wide variety of antitrust areas. Indeed, an extreme example 
may be found in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp.,332 in which the Supreme Court rejected the consideration of 
empirical data to determine whether defendants engaged in preda-
tory pricing, in favor of abstract theoretical economic arguments 
that predatory pricing could not exist.333 Although extreme, this is 
not an isolated example. 
Movement toward theory will not increase the level of debate 
among the competing schools of antitrust thought above that which 
already occurs at the empirical level. Nor will a theoretical approach 
be any more amenable to particular biases. Guidelines, however, 
must be structured so that the legal conclusions reached are consis-
tent with the theoretical analysis. For example, economic theory 
tells us that dealer termination could be due either to free riding 
activities334 or to facilitate cartelization pricing.335 A legal standard 
must be established to enable the trier of fact to distinguish more 
precisely between the two possibilities. 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,336 for example, provides 
one such guideline by requiring the jury to focus on whether the 
manufacturer's termination was an independent act.337 Such a stan-
dard leans toward the view that protection of the manufacturer's 
market strategy is of paramount importance. Under that view, juries 
will declare a manufacturer's restraints illegal only when there is no 
possible basis for the manufacturer's decision other than some form 
of price cartelization.3s8 The Monsanto standard does not imply that 
no trade-off occurs between permitting anticompetitive behavior 
and invalidating legal behavior. The Monsanto Court chose to mini-
mize the circumstances in which legal behavior was condemned 
332. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
333. Id. at 595-99; see supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text. 
334. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11. 
335. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
336. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
337. !d. at 760-64. 
338. See id. at 764 (stating that in order for termination to have antitrust conse-
quences "[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manu-
facturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently"). 
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without foreclosing the condemnation of clearly anticompetitive 
conduct. This legal standard reflects the economic reality that the 
motivations behind dealer terminations are ambiguous. 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,339 on the other 
hand, does not provide such a standard. The standard it uses is not 
based on any economic justifications. It simply, and arbitrarily, 
selects a factor--agreements as to price levels34°-that delineates a 
group that is not identified with a particular economic result. In-
deed,Justice Scalia implicitly acknowledged this when he stated that 
there is no economic justification for invalidating agreements to ter-
minate price discounters when there is no agreement as to price.341 
Such an admission recognizes that there is also no economic justifi-
cation to single out terminations of discounters when there is an 
agreement as to price.342 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia had no hesi-
tancy in limiting illegal condemnation to a subset of price-dis-
counter terminations, despite the lack of an economic basis for 
making that distinction. The danger of such arbitrary divisions is 
that they may prove to be wrong. As already has been demon-
strated,S43 the basis for Justice Scalia's differentiation is in fact inva-
lid, because agreements as to specific price levels .are not necessary 
for dealer cartelization to succeed. 
Creating new legal standards that are tied to economic insights 
only can be done in the context of a rule of reason analysis. The per 
se schools on either end of the spectrum lack tlie necessary flexibil-
ity. The Modern Populist School, with its focus on agreements for 
the purpose of determining whether trade has been restricted un-
duly, necessarily is forced into making arbitrary choices. Because 
virtually all business conduct involves some form of agreement, de-
termining which agreements are legal and which are not, absent any 
~conomic (or other) theory to make those distinctions, is bound to 
be discretionary. As a result, cases decided under that approach 
tend to have random results· that appear quite inconsistent.844 
The Chicago School, on the other hand, suffers from the other 
extreme. By relying on the marketplace to resolve most, if not all, 
339. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
340. Id. at 735-36. 
341. See id. at 727. 
342. Justice Scalia does argue that cartels are difficult to fonn and maintain. and that 
without agreements as to price, cartels would be even more difficult to achieve. See ide at 
726-27. But this does not seem to justify such sharp distinctions of extremes so that 
tenninations of price discounters in the presence of price agreements are declared per 
se illegal while those without such agreements are not, particularly if they are then ren-
dered de facto per se legal. Economic analysis, furthennore, indicates that such sharp 
distinctions are unwarranted. 
343. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text. 
344. See. e.g.. Albrecht V. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (stating that mere acquies-
cence to a price list could constitute vertical price fixing); United States V. Arnold 
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anticompetitive behavior, its position ultimately is limitless. Almost 
all behavior will, by definition, be market driven and therefore con-
sidered procompetitive, whether or not it is procompetitive in fact. 
Conclusion 
The arguments surrounding vertical price restraints can be seen 
as part of a larger battle between the Modem Populist School and 
the Chicago School. The Modem Populist School has as its focus 
the prevention of monopolistic tendencies of business behavior. 
The Chicago School, on the other hand, wishes to protect efficient 
conduct of corporations in pursuit of their competitive activities by 
limiting government regulation. 
In pursuit of their respective goals, each school is drawn to ex-
treme standards-the erection of per se rules. Such per se evalua-
tions do not allow for the legitimate concerns of the opposing 
school. In addition, by advocating maximum protection against 
their respective perceived evils, each school's approach leaves soci-
ety subject to the very probl~ms sought to be avoided. Thus, the 
Modem Populists, by erecting per se rules to stop monopolization, 
actually create impediments to corporate attempts to foster healthy 
competition. The Chicago School, by advocating per se legality to 
protect corporate efficiency, puts the nation at risk of unreasonable 
restraints of trade. Clearly, any articulated standard successfully will 
protect against one evil in some cases and in others will permit the 
occurrence of another evil. The question is what trade-off between 
the two competing harms should be made. Both the Modem Popu-
list School and the Chicago School are guilty of not permitting any 
trade-off, hence their tendency towards per se rules. The only 
framework that permits the weighing and balancing of competing 
concerns is the rule of reason. Furthermore, the rule of reason can 
facilitate minimizing the extent of trade-off necessary, by permitting 
the courts to tailor their judgments to the specific circumstances. 
Those scholars who advocate the application of the rule of reason to 
all vertical restraints, including those involving price, are correct 
that such an approach will maximize society'S efficiency while mini-
mizing the risk of antitrust harm. Their interpretation that Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.345 continues the expansion 
of the rule of reason begun by Continental T. v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc. 346 and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service CO.347 may, however, be 
erroneous. Those commentators who object to the use of the rule 
of reason for vertical price restraints and want to maintain per se 
illegal treatment have good reason to be alarmed, because Sharp 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (applying Modem Populist standard of per se ille-
gality); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (recognizing that non-
price restraints might have strong pro competitive effects but ultimately remanding for 
trial). 
345. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
346. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
347. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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may have set the stage for vertical price restraints to escape antitrust 
scrutiny altogether. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Alarmed by the barriers erected by Sharp to vertical price fixing 
litigation, particularly when coupled with the confusing evidentiary 
standards suggested by Monsanto, each house of Congress has acted 
to curtail the effects of these decisions.548 Although each house's 
bill purports to have the common goal of overruling Sharp and Mon-
santo,549 close examination of the bills reveals that the struggle be-
. tween preserving populist concepts of competition on the one hand 
and protecting efficient business conduct on the other extends to 
the legislative branch. Moreover, though one might infer that an 
intent to overrule Sharp and Monsanto would indicate a return to the 
stricter standards of per se illegality advocated by the Populist 
School, the two chambers instead have chosen to advance the reach 
of the rule of reason to extend to vertical relationships. 
As might be expected, both bills overrule Sharp·s requirement that 
there be agreements on price levels for concerted action to consti-
tute vertical price fixing.s5o But both bills seek what neither Sharp 
nor Monsanto dared to suggest and ARGO only hinted at-to take 
vertical maximum price fixing out of the per se category and evalu-
ate it instead under the rule of reason. The Senate version does so 
explicitly,551 and the House version. by creating an exception for 
maximum price setting,852 does so implicitly. 
Consistent with their expressed goals, the two bills soften Mon-
santo's requirement that "the possibility of independent action" be 
excluded before a vertical price fixing agreement could be found.353 
A philosophical difference between the chambers is evident in the 
standards each imposes instead. The Senate bill, requiring that the 
retailer's price discounting be the major cause for its termination 
before the termination can be found to be illegal,554 reflects a mod-
ern market approach. This approach protects any nonprice motiva-
tions that may be behind the manufacturer's conduct. The House 
bill merely requires that the manufacturer's termination be "in re-
sponse" to another dealer's complaint.355 This approach indicates 
348. S.429, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1470, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
349. S. REP. No. 102-42, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 18-20 (1991) [hereinafter SENATE 
REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 102-237, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter HOUSE 
REPORT]. 
350. S.429 § 39(b); H.R. 1470 § 2(b). 
351. S.429 § 3(b). 
352. H.R. 1470 § 2(b). 
353. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). 
354. S. 429 § 3(a)(I)(B)(ii). 
355. H.R. 1470 § 2(a)(2). 
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sympathy for the Modern Populist School's emphasis on deterring 
possible interference with the market pricing mechanism. In spite 
of these differences, however, the committee reports to both bills 
make it clear that both bills intend to preserve the manufacturer's 
independent efficient conduct, which requires market evaluation. 
Their disagreement primarily lies in the extent to which they are 
willing to risk the possibility that some vertical price fixing will fall 
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. 
Thus, though the battle between prserving certain market struc-
tures and protecting effi,cient corporate activity continues, it appears 
that the inevitable resolution is down the road to the rule of reason. 
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Case 
J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, 
Inc., 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir. 
1990), ccrt. denied, III S. Ct. 
1313 (1991). 
DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington 
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 
1499 (lIth Cir. 1989), ceri. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 1813 (1990). 
International Logistics Group, 
Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 
904 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
1I0 S. Ct. 1783 (1990). 
H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med-
ical Sys., 879 F.2d 1005 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. 
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of 
Am., 850 F.2d 1373 (lOth Cir. 
1988). 
Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 
849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., -
825 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 
(1988). 
Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. 
Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 
824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 
(1988). 
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield 
Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 
(7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 484 U.S. 
977 (1987). 
Disposition 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Vacated. . 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Reversed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Dismissal for Failure to State a 
Claim Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
JNOV for Defendant Affirmed. 
JNOV for Defendant Reversed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
356. This list corresponds with the discussion supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
This list was compiled through a LEXIS search conducted in September 1991. The 
search terms used were: "ANTITRUST" and "VERTICAL RESTRAINTS" and "PER 
SE" and "DEALER" or "DISTRIBUTOR" w/5 "TERMINATION" and 199* or 198* 
or 197*. The search retrieved 42 cases. Four cases were excluded because they were 
decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th 
Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984), was excluded because of its ascension to the 
Supreme Court. The remaining seven cases were excluded because they were not dealer 
termination cases. 
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Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart 
InCI, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th 
Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 486 U.S. 
1005 (1988). 
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212 
(5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 
717 (1988). 
Jayco Sys. v. Savin Business 
Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306 
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 816 (1986). 
Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 
763 F.2d 1482 (3d Cir. 1985), 
vacated and remanded for further 
consideration in light oj Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), 
475 U.S. 1105 (1986). 
Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval 
Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. 
Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (llth 
Cir. 1983). 
Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion 
Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
JBL Enters. v. Jhirmack Enters., 
698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (l983). 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. 
American Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 
1253 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 
673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 
984 (8th Cir. 1982). 
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 
840 (lOth Cir. 1981). 
Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart 
Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. 
v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 637 F.2d 
1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 831 (1981). 
66 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed 
and Judgment for Defendant 
Ordered. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Reversed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Affirmed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Judgment for Defendant Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Judgment for Defendant Affirmed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Reversed. 
Judgment for Defendant Supplier 
Affirmed, Judgment for Com-
peting Dealers Reversed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
[VOL. 60:1 
Black and White Thinking in Gray Areas 
Red Diamond Supply. Inc. v. Liq-
uid Carbonic Corp .• 637 F.2d 
1001 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 827 (1981). 
Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Cer-
tain-Teed Prods. Corp .• 638 
F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 
F.2d 751 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 965 (1980). 
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp •• 
579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978). 
Knutson v. Daily Review. Inc., 
548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976). 
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
1991] 
TIlE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
JNOV for Defendant Affirmed. 
Directed Verdict for Defendant 
Affirmed. 
Judgment for Defendant Affirmed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed. 
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